Myrette-Crosley v. Ditech Home Loans
- James Donato
- 3:17-cv-05528
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 2
In Myrette-Crosley v. Ditech Home Loans, Judge Donato dismissed three claims under Ditech’s bankruptcy injunction and dismissed the remaining claim with prejudice.
Faye Myrette-Crosley’s claims were dismissed, and judgment was entered against her. Ditech Home Loans was the defendant specifically addressed in the specific-performance ruling.
What happened
In Myrette-Crosley v. Ditech Home Loans, Faye Myrette-Crosley brought claims involving debt collection, lending disclosures, fraudulent concealment, and specific performance. The opinion does not describe the underlying events in detail.
The court dismissed the debt-collection, lending, and fraudulent-concealment claims because Ditech’s confirmed bankruptcy plan permanently barred them. The court also dismissed the specific-performance claim with prejudice for failure to state a legally sufficient claim.
Judge Donato explained that a prior lawsuit did not pause the deadline for the specific-performance claim because Myrette-Crosley did not show that Ditech had notice of that lawsuit. He also stated that specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract, not an independent claim, and entered judgment against Myrette-Crosley.
The detailed version
- Myrette-Crosley v. Ditech Home Loans · No. 3:17-cv-05528
- James Donato
- Apr. 16, 2020
Background
Faye Myrette-Crosley’s first amended complaint asserted claims under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, the Truth in Lending Act, fraudulent concealment, and specific performance. The opinion addresses Ditech Home Loans’s bankruptcy proceedings and the court’s earlier dismissal of the specific-performance claim as time-barred.
Claims Dismissed Under the Bankruptcy Injunction
The court dismissed the claims under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and fraudulent concealment pursuant to the permanent injunction entered as part of Ditech’s confirmed bankruptcy plan. The court also relied on a later bankruptcy-court order enforcing the plan’s injunctive provisions, which expressly confirmed that these causes of action had to be dismissed.
Specific-Performance Claim
The remaining claim sought specific performance. The court had previously dismissed that claim as time-barred, and Ditech moved to dismiss on that ground. Myrette-Crosley did not oppose the motion.
Myrette-Crosley alleged that a prior lawsuit seeking equitable remedies paused the limitations period. The court explained that, under California law, equitable tolling based on a prior proceeding requires timely notice, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable and good-faith conduct by the plaintiff. The court found no indication that Ditech had any relationship to the prior case or had appeared in it. Myrette-Crosley also did not allege that Ditech knew about that case or explain how the earlier case gave Ditech notice of the specific-performance claim. The court therefore concluded that equitable tolling did not apply.
The court further held that specific performance is a remedy associated with breach of contract, rather than a standalone cause of action. Because Myrette-Crosley challenged the formation of the contract rather than alleging a breach, the court stated that rescission and restitution—not specific performance—would be the appropriate remedies. After considering Myrette-Crosley’s multiple opportunities to amend, the court dismissed the specific-performance claim against Ditech with prejudice.
Disposition
The court dismissed the case and entered judgment against Myrette-Crosley. The opinion’s stated dispositions were dismissal of the three claims under the bankruptcy injunction and dismissal with prejudice of the specific-performance claim for failure to state a claim.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.