Melo v. Zumper, Inc.
- Phyllis Hamilton
- 4:20-cv-00714
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 9
Melo v. Zumper: Judge Hamilton denied relief from Melo’s voluntary dismissal, leaving the dismissal effective under Rule 41.
Ernest Melo and Zumper, Inc.; the ruling concerned Melo’s dismissal of his claims against Zumper.
What happened
In Melo v. Zumper, Inc., Ernest Melo voluntarily dismissed his claims against Zumper after Zumper sought to compel arbitration. Melo then asked the court to undo that dismissal, saying his counsel misunderstood its legal consequences.
The court said Melo’s dismissal was deliberate, not an accidental omission, and that a second voluntary dismissal of the same claims operated as a decision on the merits under Rule 41. The court also found no extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.
Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton denied Melo’s motion for relief from the Rule 41 dismissal.
The detailed version
- Melo v. Zumper, Inc. · No. 4:20-cv-00714
- Phyllis Hamilton
- Apr. 16, 2020
Background
Ernest Melo filed a class action against Zumper, Inc. and Trade House Data alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act based on allegedly false judgment and eviction information connected to an apartment rental application and background checks. The case was transferred from the Eastern District of Virginia to the Northern District of California.
Zumper moved to compel arbitration, and Trade House joined that motion. After receiving extensions of time, Melo’s counsel indicated that Melo intended to stipulate to Zumper’s motion. Instead, Melo opposed Trade House’s joinder and then filed a notice voluntarily dismissing all claims against Zumper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Melo later filed a notice withdrawing the dismissal and moved for relief under Rule 60(b).
Melo’s Arguments
Melo argued that the dismissal resulted from mistake or excusable neglect because his counsel did not understand the consequences of a second voluntary dismissal. He also argued that relief was warranted for other extraordinary reasons because the dismissal could prevent him from pursuing arbitration without Zumper asserting that the claims were already resolved.
Court’s Analysis
The court explained that a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) takes effect when filed and ordinarily requires no court order. Because Melo had previously dismissed the same claims against Zumper in an earlier federal action, the court applied Rule 41(a)(1)(B), which provides that a second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.
The court rejected relief under Rule 60(b)(1). It distinguished an accidental mistake or an omission from a deliberate litigation choice based on a mistaken understanding of the law. The court found that Melo’s decision to dismiss was deliberate and voluntary: rather than stipulate to Zumper’s motion to compel arbitration, he filed for arbitration in Northern Virginia and dismissed his claims against Zumper. The court concluded that Rule 60(b)(1) does not generally relieve a party from the consequences of a deliberate action that the party later regrets.
The court also rejected relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which requires injury and extraordinary circumstances beyond the moving party’s control. Melo’s choice to file the dismissal was within his or his counsel’s control, and the court found no other facts establishing extraordinary circumstances. The court stated that granting relief in these circumstances would undermine the two-dismissal rule.
Disposition
The court DENIED Melo’s motion for relief from the Rule 41 voluntary dismissal.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.