Avenmarg v. Humboldt County

Background

Debra Avenmarg sued Humboldt County and Jeffrey Blanck, the County Counsel, asserting five federal claims and six state-law claims. She alleged that the defendants interfered with her constitutional rights involving privacy and familial association, retaliated against her for pursuing rights in a child-dependency proceeding, interfered with her right to petition the courts, violated California Labor Code section 1102.5, defamed her, interfered with contractual relations, and caused emotional distress.

Avenmarg alleged that she worked as a Deputy County Counsel while caring for a child identified in the opinion as “GN.” She said the County initially screened her from GN’s dependency case because of an alleged conflict of interest. After GN became her foster child, she filed motions seeking visitation and de facto parent status. According to the complaint, County officials told her to withdraw those motions or leave her job, and she was fired after refusing. She later obtained de facto parent status and began contracting with the Humboldt County Superior Court to represent people in juvenile dependency matters. The County Counsel’s Office then filed motions seeking to disqualify her from cases, but withdrew those motions before a ruling. Blanck later submitted a complaint to the California State Bar that was investigated and closed without further action.

Legal standard

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly show a right to relief. Conclusory statements and unreasonable inferences are not enough.

Federal constitutional claims and municipal liability

For Claims 1 through 4, and also Claim 5, the County argued that Avenmarg had not adequately alleged municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. A municipality can be liable under that statute when an official policy, custom, or practice causes a constitutional violation, but it is not automatically liable for an employee’s actions merely because the employee works for it.

The court found that Avenmarg had not alleged facts showing that Blanck had final policymaking authority under state or local law. The court also found that her allegation that the County ratified or approved the challenged conduct was conclusory. Because the court was not certain the deficiencies could not be corrected, it dismissed Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 on this ground without prejudice and granted leave to amend. The amendment needed to allege facts showing Blanck’s final policymaking authority or explaining how a final policymaker ratified or adopted the conduct, and it needed to clarify Blanck’s role in the alleged policy.

The defendants also argued that Avenmarg’s relationship with GN was not constitutionally protected. The court rejected dismissal on that ground. It held that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Avenmarg had alleged enough facts about the relationship—including the time they lived together, their emotional bond, and GN’s treatment of her as a parent—to allege a relationship that might receive at least some constitutional protection. The court did not decide what level of protection the relationship ultimately deserved.

The court also declined to dismiss Claims 1 and 2 as duplicative of Claims 4 and 5. Although privacy and intimate-association theories may involve the same analysis, the cited authority did not establish that the claims were duplicative. The court stated that any new claim based on disclosure of personal information would need to be included in an amended complaint.

As to Claim 5, which challenged the County’s alleged policy barring deputy county counsels from pursuing foster parenting in Humboldt County, the court denied dismissal based on the argument that the relationship with GN was not constitutionally protected. The court concluded that Avenmarg had alleged enough facts to make the claim plausible, without deciding the ultimate level of constitutional protection.

Claim 3: retaliation for petitioning

Claim 3 alleged that the defendants took adverse employment actions against Avenmarg because she filed motions in GN’s dependency case. The court held that she had not adequately alleged that her speech concerned a public matter. The dependency proceedings were confidential, and the filings concerned private grievances about visitation and participation in GN’s case. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 3 without prejudice. The conclusion directed that any amendment address whether her speech involved a public matter.

Claim 2: disqualification motions

The defendants invoked the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which can protect petitioning the government from liability, but the doctrine has an exception when the petitioning process is used to injure someone rather than to obtain relief. The court held that Avenmarg sufficiently alleged that the disqualification motions were objectively baseless, based on allegations that the defendants had previously said there was no actual conflict, sought disqualification from cases that did not exist during her County employment, and withdrew the motions before a ruling. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss Claim 2 to the extent it was based on the disqualification motions. The conclusion nevertheless stated that Claim 2 was dismissed with leave to amend to allege facts that the motions were objectively baseless, reflecting an ambiguity in how the order describes the claim’s separate theories and required amendment.

Claim 8: defamation

Claim 8 alleged defamation under California law. The court found that the complaint did not identify the specific conduct or statements that Avenmarg claimed were defamatory and instead largely recited the elements of defamation. The court granted dismissal on this ground. The conclusion states that Claim 8 was dismissed with leave to amend so Avenmarg could identify the allegedly defamatory speech with specificity.

Claim 6: California Labor Code section 1102.5

Claim 6 alleged retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5, a whistleblower statute. The court held that Avenmarg alleged retaliation for petitioning the government in GN’s dependency case, not retaliation for disclosing information about a legal violation or noncompliance. Because the complaint did not identify protected whistleblower activity, the court dismissed Claim 6 with leave to amend. The court did not decide whether section 1102.5 permits individual liability because the complaint did not adequately allege that the statute applied.

Other state-law claims and disposition

The defendants did not seek dismissal of the remaining state-law claims, so the court did not address whether those claims were adequately pleaded.

The court held that Humboldt County’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and that Blanck’s separate motion was granted. The court granted leave to amend the affected claims and ordered Avenmarg to file an amended pleading within 30 days. The order states that failure to amend would result in dismissal of the affected claims with prejudice; if she did not amend, the First Amended Complaint would remain operative for Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 against Blanck.