Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Background

Jane Doe brought tort claims against Uber Technologies, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiaries Rasier, LLC, and Rasier CA, LLC. She alleged that she was assaulted by a former Uber driver who posed as a current Uber driver. The court had previously dismissed her claims but allowed her to amend them. Uber then moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), concerning jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), concerning whether the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim.

Claims Based on Ostensible Agency

The First Amended Complaint asserted false imprisonment, assault, and battery claims based on an ostensible-agency theory. That theory can make a principal responsible for an apparent agent’s conduct when the principal’s representations reasonably cause someone to rely on the relationship. The court held that Jane Doe had not plausibly alleged that the assault occurred within the scope of the driver’s ostensible employment. Applying California law, the court concluded that the assault was the driver’s independent conduct and was not sufficiently connected to the work he was employed to perform.

The court therefore granted Uber’s motion to dismiss the false-imprisonment, assault, and battery claims based on ostensible agency. Because the court had previously allowed amendment and found further amendment would be futile, it dismissed those claims without leave to amend.

Negligence Claims

Jane Doe asserted two negligence theories: negligence based on a common carrier’s duty to use the utmost care, and ordinary negligence. The court dismissed the common-carrier theory because Jane Doe had not plausibly alleged that Uber and she had a common-carrier/passenger relationship at the time of the assault that would create the heightened duty required by California law. That claim was dismissed without leave to amend because the court had previously allowed amendment and found further amendment futile.

The court allowed the ordinary negligence claim to proceed. It declined to require particular wording, such as expressly alleging a duty of “ordinary care” or “due care,” and treated the fourth claim as an ordinary negligence claim. The court found that Jane Doe plausibly alleged that Uber’s affirmative actions—such as its driver-screening process, safety representations, and distribution of vehicle decals—created a foreseeable risk of harm by encouraging people to enter vehicles identified by those decals.

Uber argued that the California Public Utilities Commission’s regulatory authority barred the negligence claim under California Public Utilities Code section 1759. The court rejected that argument at the pleading stage. Although the Commission regulates transportation network companies and has adopted requirements concerning vehicle trade dress, the court found that the cited orders did not require Uber to give decals to a particular person or prevent Uber from restricting who could use them. The court concluded that Uber had not shown as a matter of law that the negligence claim would interfere with Commission policy.

Disposition

Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted in part and denied in part Uber’s motion to dismiss. The motion was denied as to Jane Doe’s negligence claim and granted in all other respects without leave to amend. Uber’s answer was due 21 days from the date of the order, and the court set a case-management conference for June 18, 2020.