AirWair International Ltd. v. Pull & Bear Espana SA
- Susan Illston
- 3:19-cv-07641
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 13
In AirWair v. Pull & Bear, Judge Illston dismissed AirWair’s claims against Pull & Bear without leave to amend because California lacked personal jurisdiction.
AirWair’s claims against Pull & Bear were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, without leave to amend. The opinion states that ITX did not join the motion; it does not state the disposition of AirWair’s claims against ITX.
What happened
AirWair International Ltd. v. Pull & Bear Espana SA involved AirWair’s claims that Pull & Bear infringed and weakened its trademarks and engaged in unfair competition by selling shoes that copied Dr. Martens’ trade dress. Pull & Bear asked the court to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that it did not conduct the relevant business in California or the United States.
The court concluded that AirWair had not shown that Pull & Bear specifically targeted California. The court said that selling through websites available in the United States, using social media, and promoting a California-style store concept did not show that Pull & Bear aimed its alleged infringement at California. The court also rejected AirWair’s efforts to attribute ITX’s website contacts to Pull & Bear, to treat ITX as Pull & Bear’s alter ego, or to establish nationwide jurisdiction.
Judge Susan Illston granted Pull & Bear’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without leave to amend. The ruling concerned the court’s authority over Pull & Bear and did not decide whether AirWair’s trademark or unfair-competition claims were valid on their merits.
The detailed version
- AirWair International Ltd. v. Pull & Bear Espana SA · No. 3:19-cv-07641
- Susan Illston
- May 4, 2020
Background
AirWair International Ltd. sued Pull & Bear España, S.A. and ITX USA, LLC. AirWair asserted federal and California claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition. It alleged that Pull & Bear marketed, distributed, offered for sale, and sold shoes that unlawfully copied Dr. Martens’ trade dress. Pull & Bear moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. ITX did not join the motion.
AirWair alleged that Pull & Bear’s Spain-facing website directed United States customers to a United States-facing website, that Pull & Bear controlled or helped control the products, prices, marketing materials, and photographs on that site, and that Pull & Bear marketed its products through Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. AirWair also relied on Pull & Bear’s references to a “California concept” in its store design and presented additional allegations concerning a UCLA licensing relationship and social-media campaign. In the alternative, AirWair argued that the court could attribute ITX’s contacts to Pull & Bear under agency or alter-ego theories and could exercise nationwide jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).
Specific Personal Jurisdiction in California
The court explained that California’s long-arm statute reaches as far as the federal Constitution allows. Because AirWair did not allege that Pull & Bear’s infringing conduct occurred inside California, the relevant question was whether Pull & Bear purposefully directed that conduct toward California. Under the “effects” test, this required an intentional act expressly aimed at California that caused harm Pull & Bear knew was likely to occur there.
The court treated Pull & Bear’s operation of the Spain-facing website, its social-media advertising, and its use of a California-style store concept as intentional acts. But it held that AirWair had not shown express aiming at California. The website and social-media allegations concerned the United States generally and did not distinguish California from the country as a whole. The court also found that describing stores as having a California concept did not show that Pull & Bear aimed sales of the allegedly infringing shoes at California consumers.
The court declined to attribute ITX’s operation of the United States-facing website to Pull & Bear. Although the websites’ similar appearance, photographs, products, and prices suggested cooperation or coordination, the allegations did not establish that Pull & Bear had the right to substantially control ITX’s activities. Because AirWair failed to show purposeful direction toward California, the court did not address whether the claims arose from forum-related activities or whether the alleged harm was foreseeable.
The court separately stated that exercising jurisdiction would not satisfy fair play and substantial justice even if purposeful direction had been shown. It found that only two of the seven relevant factors favored AirWair: the importance of California to obtaining effective relief and the lack of an established conflict with Spanish sovereignty. Other factors favored Pull & Bear, including the limited purposeful injection into California, the burdens of litigating there, California’s limited interest in a dispute between the foreign corporations, and the availability of possible alternative forums. The efficiency factor was neutral or possibly leaned slightly toward Pull & Bear.
Alter-Ego Theory
The court rejected AirWair’s attempt to treat ITX as Pull & Bear’s alter ego. An alter ego theory requires a prima facie showing of such unity of interest and ownership that the entities’ separate identities no longer exist, and that respecting those identities would result in fraud or injustice.
AirWair alleged that Pull & Bear and ITX were ultimately owned by Inditex, that their websites were virtually identical, that ITX did not own Pull & Bear’s United States trademark, that ITX had few or no assets, that the entities shared office space with other Inditex-related entities, and that they shared employees or officers. The court found these allegations insufficient. It said the facts mainly showed relationships between ITX and Inditex, not the required relationship between ITX and Pull & Bear. The court also found that the officer information concerning Pull & Bear UK was not relevant because the defendant was Pull & Bear España.
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction
AirWair also relied on Rule 4(k)(2), which can allow federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant for federal claims based on contacts with the United States as a whole. The court said the relevant due-process analysis was otherwise the same, but the forum was the entire country rather than California.
The court concluded that AirWair’s allegations did not demonstrate a comparable level of nationwide contacts. It therefore declined to impose nationwide jurisdiction on Pull & Bear and found no facts showing a need for limited jurisdictional discovery.
Disposition
The court GRANTED Pull & Bear’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, without leave to amend. The order addressed the court’s jurisdiction over Pull & Bear and did not resolve the merits of AirWair’s trademark, dilution, or unfair-competition claims.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.