Abraham v. Black

Background

Arthur Abraham was committed to Napa State Hospital after California proceedings in 1985 found him not guilty by reason of insanity of second-degree murder and inducing a criminal abortion. He later sought release under California Penal Code section 1026.2, which permits release to a supervised community program if the person proves that he would not pose a danger to the health and safety of others because of a mental defect, disease, or disorder.

In 2015, the San Mateo County Superior Court denied Abraham’s release petition after hearing testimony from a psychologist who supported release and a psychiatrist who opposed it. The trial court found that Abraham had a mental disorder and that his refusal to complete treatment programs, along with what the court viewed as manipulative behavior, raised concerns about the danger he posed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court denied Abraham’s certiorari petition on April 15, 2019.

Claims

Abraham brought a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal procedure allowing a person in state custody to challenge custody that violates federal law. He raised two due-process claims:

1. California improperly placed the burden of proof on him, rather than the State, to establish that he should be released. 2. His continued confinement violated due process because he had regained his sanity and his current diagnosis differed from the condition identified when he was initially committed.

Because the California Court of Appeal had decided these constitutional claims on the merits, Judge Chen applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Under that law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Court’s analysis

Burden of proof. Judge Chen concluded that the Supreme Court had not decided which party must bear the burden of proof when an insanity acquittee seeks release from a state hospital. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Addington v. Texas, Jones v. United States, and Foucha v. Louisiana addressed related issues but did not clearly answer that question. The California Court of Appeal therefore did not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply, clearly established federal law when it upheld California’s requirement that Abraham prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not be dangerous because of a mental disorder.

Current diagnosis and release. Judge Chen also upheld the state court’s determination that Abraham had an “other specified personality disorder” with antisocial and narcissistic traits. Both experts had diagnosed a personality disorder, even though they differed about its significance and whether Abraham should be released. The court held that Abraham had not overcome the state court’s factual determination that he had a mental disorder.

Judge Chen further held that California law did not require the mental disorder supporting continued confinement to be the same condition that existed when Abraham was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha did not clearly establish the different rule Abraham proposed. Because no clearly established Supreme Court precedent required release based solely on a changed diagnosis or a finding that the person was no longer “insane” under Abraham’s interpretation, the state court’s decision was not unreasonable under the federal habeas standard.

Disposition

The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits and ordered the file closed. It also denied a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.