Coon v. San Mateo County

Background

Zephaniah Coon filed a complaint asserting eight federal and state-law causes of action against the County of San Mateo and Blake Lycett, alleged to have been a San Mateo County deputy sheriff. Coon alleged that, after his arrest on a narcotics charge and transfer to the Maguire Correctional Facility, Lycett attacked him while he was in a general holding area. The complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five state common-law causes of action.

For the state-law claims, Coon alleged that he had complied with California’s Government Claims Act by sending a claim to San Mateo County Counsel John Beiers on March 24, 2019. The attached notice was addressed to Beiers.

Legal standard

The defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. In deciding that motion, the court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true but need not accept legal conclusions or unreasonable inferences.

Government Claims Act

The defendants argued that the state-law claims were barred because Coon sent his claim to County Counsel rather than to a recipient designated by California Government Code § 915(a), such as the local entity’s clerk, secretary, auditor, or governing body at its principal office.

Coon did not dispute that he sent the claim to Beiers or that Beiers was not a statutorily designated recipient. Instead, he argued that he had substantially complied with the law because the County had enough information to investigate the incident. He also argued that any defect had been waived because the County did not give notice of the claim’s insufficiency.

The court rejected those arguments based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara. The court explained that the statute requires a claim to be delivered to one of the designated recipients, or, if misdirected, to have been actually received by a designated recipient within the required period. The court concluded that DiCampli-Mintz foreclosed Coon’s substantial-compliance argument. It also concluded that the waiver argument did not apply because Coon did not dispute that he had failed to present the claim to a statutorily designated recipient.

The court did not decide the defendants’ additional arguments concerning whether the claim was timely or whether equitable tolling applied. It stated that Coon did not seek leave to amend to allege that the claim had actually been presented to a designated recipient.

Immunity

The County separately argued that California Government Code § 844.6 made it immune from liability for the state-law claims. That provision generally protects a public entity from liability for an injury to a prisoner, and the court noted that a pretrial detainee qualifies as a prisoner for this purpose.

Coon conceded that his state-law claims against the County were barred by immunity. He asked for permission to remove the County from those claims and continue against Lycett and the Doe defendants personally.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth through eighth causes of action against the County without leave to amend. It granted Coon leave to amend those causes of action against Lycett and the Doe defendants in their personal capacities. The amended complaint was due May 12, 2020. Judge Susan Illston also vacated the scheduled hearing because she found the motion suitable for resolution without oral argument; the case-management conference remained scheduled.