Moulton v. Gjerde
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:20-cv-02374
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Moulton v. Gjerde, Judge Chesney denied Moulton’s temporary restraining order because she showed no ongoing threat of being blocked from Facebook.
The ruling directly affected Brandy Moulton’s request for immediate protection of her access to the Facebook page operated by Dan Gjerde; the court denied that requested relief.
What happened
In Moulton v. Gjerde, Brandy Moulton alleged that Dan Gjerde, a county supervisor, blocked her from a Facebook page used to discuss his work as a local official. She claimed this violated federal civil-rights law and asked the court to restore her access immediately.
Gjerde stated that he had changed the page settings so that no one was blocked, restoring Moulton’s access by March 5 or 6, 2020. Moulton did not dispute that she had full access afterward. The court said an order requiring future access requires evidence of a real and immediate threat that the person will be blocked again, not just proof of a past incident. Moulton provided no evidence of such a future threat.
Judge Maxine M. Chesney therefore denied Moulton’s application for a temporary restraining order. The court did not decide whether the earlier blocking violated federal civil-rights law.
The detailed version
- Moulton v. Gjerde · No. 3:20-cv-02374
- Maxine Chesney
- May 11, 2020
Background
Brandy Moulton sued Dan Gjerde in his official capacity as Supervisor for the County of Mendocino. Moulton alleged that, in February 2020, Gjerde blocked her from a Facebook page titled “Dan Gjerde, 4th District Supervisor.” She described the page as a public forum that Gjerde had created for constituents to interact with one another and with him about his actions as a local government official. Her complaint alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Request and legal standard
Moulton applied for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Gjerde from restricting her access to the Facebook page. She also sought an order requiring Gjerde to explain why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction. The court stated that temporary restraining orders use the same standard as preliminary injunctions. That standard generally requires a plaintiff to show likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without immediate relief, a favorable balance of hardships, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. A plaintiff may instead raise serious questions about the merits if the other requirements are met and the balance of hardships strongly favors the plaintiff.
Court’s reasoning
Moulton stated that she expressed concerns about Gjerde’s job performance on the Facebook page around February 22, 2020, and was blocked shortly afterward. Gjerde stated that he blocked Moulton on or about February 19, 2020, but changed the page settings on March 5 or 6 so that no one was blocked. He stated that Moulton had full access from that point forward. The court noted that Moulton did not dispute that she had not been restricted from accessing or using the page as of March 6, 2020, and that she had not been deprived of access when she filed her complaint on April 8, 2020.
Because Moulton sought an injunction, the court required her to show a real or immediate threat that she would be wronged again. The court held that a past injury alone was insufficient and found that Moulton offered no evidence that she faced an imminent or future threat of being blocked again.
Disposition
The court denied Moulton’s application for a temporary restraining order. The opinion addressed the requested preliminary relief and standing to obtain an injunction; it did not decide the merits of Moulton’s § 1983 claim.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.