Burnes v. Melanie Chavez

Background

Siphannay Sothary Burnes sued California State University of Monterey Bay and university employees Britt Rios-Ellis, Ed Ochoa, Christopher Forest, Melanie Chavez, Daramola Cabral, Karen Rotabi, and Wendy Smith. Burnes alleged that Forest sexually harassed her by blocking her from leaving her office and subjecting her to a nonconsensual sexual embrace. She further alleged that, after she reported the harassment, the defendants subjected her to discrimination and retaliation through November 2018.

Burnes’s First Amended Complaint asserted twelve claims for relief, including gender discrimination and sexual harassment, retaliation, sexual harassment and assault under California law, false imprisonment, emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and several negligence theories. The first two claims included claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal employment-discrimination law. The remaining portions of the claims were based on state law.

Procedural History and Legal Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss all twelve claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court also considered requests for judicial notice, meaning requests to accept certain court and agency records as proper matters for consideration. It granted both parties’ requests for judicial notice, while explaining that it could notice the existence and filing dates of the records without accepting the truth of factual statements contained in them.

The court also granted Burnes’s motion to reopen briefing by construing it as an additional request for judicial notice of administrative records. The court did not reopen briefing because it concluded that further briefing was unnecessary.

Title VII Claims

The defendants argued that Burnes’s Title VII claims should be dismissed because she failed to timely complete the required administrative process. The court agreed. It explained that a Title VII plaintiff ordinarily must first file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, when a state agency has authority over the matter, must first file with that state agency. The court stated that the charge generally had to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice under the circumstances described in the opinion.

Neither Burnes’s original complaint nor her First Amended Complaint alleged that she had completed this process or had filed a charge with the appropriate agencies before bringing the case. Although her opposition stated that she had already filed complaints and received a right-to-sue letter, the court found that no such letter was attached to either complaint. The later records showed that Burnes filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on March 13, 2020. The court found that this was after the 300-day period had expired, because Burnes identified November 2018 as the date of her last known injury and the court calculated that the period ended in September 2019.

The court also rejected Burnes’s explanation that a paralegal’s illness and the shutdown of her counsel’s office prevented timely filing. The court stated that those events occurred after the September 2019 deadline and did not explain the conflicting statements about whether Burnes had already filed and received a right-to-sue letter. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII portions of Claims One and Two for failure to complete the required administrative process.

The dismissal of the Title VII claims was without prejudice, and the court granted Burnes leave to amend. Although the court believed amendment was likely futile, it could not conclusively determine that amendment would be futile. The court stated that an amended complaint that did not correct the identified deficiencies and inconsistencies could result in dismissal of the deficient claims with prejudice.

State-Law Claims

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over Burnes’s state-law claims. It explained that all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction had been dismissed, the case remained at the pleading stage, and the parties had not exchanged initial disclosures. The court also determined that declining jurisdiction would conserve federal judicial resources and allow California courts to address questions of California law.

The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice. The order did not decide the merits of those state-law claims.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. Burnes was given 21 days to file an amended complaint and could not add new claims or parties without agreement or court permission. If she did not timely amend, or if an amendment failed to correct the stated deficiencies and inconsistencies, the deficient claims would be dismissed with prejudice. The order also stated that Burnes could pursue her state-law claims in state court if she chose not to continue the Title VII claims in federal court.

Judge Lucy H. Koh signed the order.