Dunbar v. Alameda County Sheriff's Office
- William Alsup
- 3:19-cv-07703
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Dunbar v. Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Judge Alsup allowed some federal civil-rights claims to proceed, dismissed others, and ordered service on five defendants.
Eddie Lamar Dunbar’s case may proceed on specified jail-condition and retaliation claims against Deputy Smith, Deputy M. Simon, Deputy R. Pereira, Deputy K. Jones, and Deputy Hellfrick. Other claims and defendants were dismissed, including some dismissals without prejudice.
What happened
Eddie Lamar Dunbar, a California state prisoner, filed this federal civil-rights case about conditions at the Alameda County Jail. After his first complaint was dismissed with permission to amend, he filed a First Amended Complaint.
The court found that claims about unsanitary jail conditions against Smith, Hellfrick, Simon, Pereira, and Jones could proceed, as could Hellfrick’s claim that he was punished for filing complaints. The court dismissed Jones’s property-deprivation claim and claims against several entities and a jail warden. It dismissed without prejudice claims involving DeLeon, Procopio, Formosa, and Calegari, along with claims about unsafe yard conditions, because those claims were not properly joined to the others.
Judge William Alsup ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve Smith, M. Simon, R. Pereira, K. Jones, and Hellfrick. The case would continue against those defendants, subject to the court’s instructions about answering, discovery, and possible dispositive motions.
The detailed version
- Dunbar v. Alameda County Sheriff's Office · No. 3:19-cv-07703
- William Alsup
- May 15, 2020
Background
Eddie Lamar Dunbar, identified as a California state prisoner, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning events at the Alameda County Jail. The court had previously dismissed his complaint with leave to amend, and Dunbar filed a First Amended Complaint. Because the action was brought by a prisoner against governmental defendants, the court screened the pleading under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That screening requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also said that it would read a self-represented litigant’s pleading liberally, while still requiring facts sufficient to make a claim plausible.
Claims Allowed to Proceed
The court found cognizable claims—claims that could proceed past screening—concerning unsanitary jail conditions against defendants Jones, Smith, Hellfrick, Simon, and Pereira. The court characterized those claims as alleging violations of Dunbar’s Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights. The court also found cognizable Hellfrick’s alleged retaliation against Dunbar for filing complaints, characterizing that claim as arising under the First Amendment.
Claims Dismissed
The court ruled that Jones’s alleged destruction or deprivation of property did not state a due-process claim under § 1983 because California provided an adequate state remedy after the alleged deprivation.
The court dismissed without prejudice the claims against DeLeon for forgery, against Procopio, Formosa, and Calegari concerning grievance handling, and concerning unsafe yard conditions that were not connected to a named defendant. The court said these claims involved different transactions and different defendants, so they were not properly joined with the other claims. “Without prejudice” means the order did not bar Dunbar from bringing those claims in a separate action.
The court also dismissed the claims against California Forensic Medical Group, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Aramark Correctional Services, and the Warden of Santa Rita County Jail because the First Amended Complaint made no allegations against them. The order did not state that this dismissal was without prejudice.
Order and Case Status
Judge William Alsup directed the clerk to issue summonses and the U.S. Marshal to serve the First Amended Complaint and the order, without requiring advance payment of fees, on Deputy Smith, Deputy M. Simon, Deputy R. Pereira, Deputy K. Jones, and Deputy Hellfrick. The remaining defendants were required to answer under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The order also set deadlines for a possible summary-judgment or other case-ending motion, opposition, and reply, and permitted discovery under the federal rules.
The order was an initial screening and service order, not a final decision on whether Dunbar would ultimately prevail on the claims allowed to proceed.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.