Savage v. Savage

Background

Colette Savage, a self-represented plaintiff and resident of Idaho, sued Mark Savage, identified as a Texas resident. The complaint concerned a promissory note and a family trust, and referred extensively to earlier proceedings in Texas and California state courts. The complaint listed more than 50 purported causes of action, including claims involving fraud, debt collection, constitutional violations, breach of contract, conversion, and emotional distress.

The state-court record described in the opinion included a 2016 California probate-court order stating that two “California Notes” were cancelled and extinguished; 2016 and 2017 Texas orders entering judgment for Mark Savage on an August 22, 2014 promissory note with an original principal amount of $240,000; and a California judgment entering the Texas judgment against Colette Savage. Later state-court proceedings affirmed or enforced those decisions, including an order directing release of funds from a blocked Bank of Marin account to partially satisfy the judgment.

Colette Savage filed two motions seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. She sought to stop the transfer of $368,000 from her Bank of Marin account to Mark Savage and to restrict his actions concerning properties in Texas.

Jurisdictional issue

Mark Savage moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. He argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the lawsuit.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court over state-court judgments. The court concluded that Colette Savage’s complaint and injunction motions challenged the Texas judgment, the California judgment enforcing it, and the California order directing release of funds. The court also concluded that her requests to declare the promissory note fraudulent, rescinded, or extinguished would require review and rejection of issues already addressed in state court.

The court took judicial notice of most of the state-court decisions, pleadings, and orders Mark Savage submitted. It denied as moot the request to notice one exhibit because that exhibit was already attached to the complaint. The court did not reach Mark Savage’s other dismissal arguments after concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Ruling

The opinion initially states that Mark Savage’s motion to dismiss was “granted in part,” but its conclusion states that the motion was “granted.” The operative conclusion dismissed Colette Savage’s complaint without prejudice. The court explained that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ordinarily does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims in a court with authority to hear them.

The court denied Colette Savage’s two motions for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint. In the discussion of those motions, the court described the denials as being without prejudice; the final conclusion states simply that the motions were denied. The Clerk was ordered to close the case. The opinion’s judge’s name is not clearly readable in the provided text.