Gaona v. Berryhill

Background

Salvador Rivas Gaona sought judicial review of a Social Security Administration decision denying his application for Title II and Title XVI benefits. In an earlier related proceeding, the court granted his motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. The parties stipulated to $2,000 in attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act.

After the application was denied again, Gaona brought this case. On March 23, 2018, the court granted his motion for summary judgment and again remanded the matter for further proceedings. The parties later stipulated to another $3,000 in Equal Access to Justice Act fees. After the second remand, the Commissioner granted Gaona’s application and awarded him $209,675 in retroactive benefits.

Gaona’s counsel, Brian C. Shapiro, moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)(B). The motion sought $25,823.75 under a contingent-fee agreement permitting counsel to seek 25% of past-due benefits for work performed before the courts. The Commissioner took no position on whether the request was reasonable, and the opinion states that no objections were received from Gaona.

Legal standard

The court explained that the statutes governing fees for Supplemental Security Income benefits incorporate the rules governing fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406. Section 406(b) generally limits fees for court representation to 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. Under the Supreme Court’s approach, the court first examines the contingent-fee agreement and then determines whether the requested amount is reasonable.

The court may reduce a fee for substandard performance, delay caused by the lawyer, or benefits that are disproportionate to the time spent. A lodestar calculation—hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate—may help assess reasonableness, but it is not the starting point or baseline for the analysis.

Court’s analysis

The court found the requested amount reasonable. First, counsel achieved favorable results by obtaining two orders remanding the case for further proceedings. Second, the record showed no undue delay or substandard performance. Counsel sought only one 35-day extension in the current case and none in the earlier related proceeding.

Third, the requested fee complied with the statutory cap and was not disproportionate to the work performed. Counsel spent 22.1 hours across the two proceedings, and a paralegal spent an additional 7.2 hours. Based only on counsel’s time, the requested fee represented an effective hourly rate of $1,168.50. The court described that rate as high but found it comparable to rates approved in other cases in the district and consistent with the risk counsel undertook in representing Gaona since 2013.

The court also determined that the Equal Access to Justice Act fees had to be deducted from the fee award to prevent counsel from receiving a double recovery. Counsel had received $5,000 under that statute: $2,000 from the earlier proceeding and $3,000 from the current proceeding.

Disposition

The court granted the motion for attorney’s fees. It awarded $25,823.75, less the $5,000 in Equal Access to Justice Act fees previously received, for a total award of $20,823.75.