Redd-Oyedele v. Santa Clara County Office of Education
- Susan Van Keulen
- 5:20-cv-00912
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Redd-Oyedele v. Santa Clara County Office of Education, Judge Van Keulen denied a request to block hiring because irreparable harm was not shown.
Ann Gerthelia Redd-Oyedele was denied immediate court-ordered relief preventing the Santa Clara County Office of Education and the other defendants from continuing the hiring process for the identified position. The underlying claims remained unresolved in this order.
What happened
Redd-Oyedele v. Santa Clara County Office of Education concerns Ann Gerthelia Redd-Oyedele’s claim that the Santa Clara County Office of Education retaliated against her by denying promotional opportunities after earlier discrimination litigation.
Redd-Oyedele asked the court to temporarily stop the defendants from filling a Director III, Business and Advisory Services position. She argued that the hiring process could be a sham and could use race and age as factors, but the opinion addresses only her request for immediate court-ordered relief.
The court denied the request because Redd-Oyedele did not show that she would suffer harm that could not later be remedied. Judge Susan Van Keulen did not reach the other requirements for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, and stated that the separate motion to dismiss would be addressed later.
The detailed version
- Redd-Oyedele v. Santa Clara County Office of Education · No. 5:20-cv-00912
- Susan Van Keulen
- June 1, 2020
Background
Ann Gerthelia Redd-Oyedele had been employed by the Santa Clara County Office of Education for almost 29 years. She previously filed racial-discrimination charges against the agency and several management employees with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving permission to sue, she brought a federal lawsuit, which was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Redd-Oyedele alleged that she had been denied promotional and career-advancement opportunities in retaliation for that earlier litigation. Her complaint asserted retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants separately moved to dismiss, arguing that she failed to complete a required administrative process; the court said it would address that motion in a separate order.
Motion for Immediate Relief
Redd-Oyedele sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction—an extraordinary court order requiring action or preventing action before the case is finally decided. She asked the court to stop the defendants from taking further steps to fill a posted position titled “Director III, Business and Advisory Services.” She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, a preferred candidate already existed and that the posting, interviews, and screening process would be a sham concealing an intent to use race and age in hiring.
To obtain either form of immediate relief, a plaintiff must show that she is likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer harm that cannot be repaired later, that the balance of equities favors her, and that the injunction would serve the public interest.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that Redd-Oyedele had not shown likely irreparable harm, meaning harm for which later money damages or another meaningful remedy would not be adequate. The court noted that she remained employed by the agency and that her declaration did not say she had actually applied for the specific Director III position at issue.
The court also reasoned that any injury from being denied that position was speculative because she had not yet been denied an offer. In addition, Redd-Oyedele had not shown that a later remedy would be inadequate if she prevailed. The court explained that a successful plaintiff might receive a promotion or reinstatement when a suitable position becomes available, along with back pay or front pay.
Disposition
Judge Susan Van Keulen denied Redd-Oyedele’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. Because the court found no likely irreparable harm, it did not reach the motion’s other requirements. This order did not decide the underlying retaliation or emotional-distress claims, and the opinion states that the defendants’ separate motion to dismiss would be addressed in a forthcoming order.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.