J.C. v. Choice Hotels International, Inc.
- William Orrick
- 3:20-cv-00155
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In J.C. v. Choice Hotels, Judge Orrick granted the hotel chains’ motions to dismiss J.C.’s trafficking claims, allowing amendment within 28 days.
J.C. and the defendant hotel chains—Choice Hotels International, Inc., Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc., and Marriott International, Inc.—were affected by the dismissal ruling; the parties were also affected by the court’s decision to defer the protective-order ruling.
What happened
J.C. v. Choice Hotels International, Inc. concerns J.C.’s claims that Choice Hotels, Hilton, and Marriott were liable for trafficking that occurred at several hotels in California and Virginia. She sued under federal and California human-trafficking laws, but sued the hotel chains rather than the local hotels.
The court found that J.C.’s federal claims might be viable, but said her direct and indirect liability theories were unclear and needed more supporting facts. It also found that she had not adequately alleged the intent required for her California claim.
Judge Orrick granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and allowed J.C. to amend her complaint within 28 days. The court also granted unopposed requests to file late oppositions concerning a protective-order motion, but did not yet decide the protective-order dispute.
The detailed version
- J.C. v. Choice Hotels International, Inc. · No. 3:20-cv-00155
- William Orrick
- June 5, 2020
Background
J.C. sued Choice Hotels International, Inc., Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc., and Marriott International, Inc. She alleged that she was trafficked at several hotels in California and Virginia. Her claims arose under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, and the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (CTVPA), California Civil Code § 52.5.
J.C. sued the hotel chains associated with the local hotels, not the local hotels themselves. She appeared to assert both direct and indirect liability. The court understood her direct-liability theory to be that the chains participated in a sex-trafficking venture by providing rooms to traffickers and knowingly benefiting financially. For indirect liability, she alleged that local hotel staff knew or should have known that she was being trafficked and that this knowledge should be attributed to the hotel chains.
Court’s Analysis
The court stated that the second amended complaint appeared capable of stating a TVPRA claim against the local hotels. But the court found J.C.’s theories against the hotel chains confusing and said an amended complaint should separately explain the direct and indirect theories and provide facts supporting each one.
The court also addressed the legal basis for indirect liability. Because the TVPRA does not expressly address indirect liability, the court said federal common-law agency principles should apply. It gave J.C. permission to amend so she could more clearly allege the facts required under those principles. The court noted that some relevant information might not be available before discovery, but said that did not excuse J.C. from plausibly stating her claims.
The court further stated that, if J.C. could adequately amend her allegations, the complaint would establish personal jurisdiction over Hilton for claims involving local hotels in both California and Virginia. The court rejected Hilton’s argument that its status as a holding company defeated jurisdiction, citing allegations that Hilton retained substantial control over a franchisee hotel’s operations.
The court found the CTVPA claim insufficient because J.C. had not adequately alleged the required intent. The court explained that the CTVPA permits damages for conduct violating California Penal Code § 236.1, which requires intent to obtain forced labor or services. Unlike the TVPRA, the CTVPA does not include a negligent “should have known” standard, and California cases require a plausible allegation of intent at the pleading stage.
Rulings
Judge William Orrick granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. J.C. may amend her second amended complaint within 28 days of the order.
The court also granted the defendants’ unopposed motions for permission to file late oppositions to J.C.’s motion for a protective order. The court did not rule on the protective-order motion itself. It stated that it would wait until the parties reached an agreement, filed a joint dispute letter, or arranged further briefing and a hearing.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.