Doe v. McAleenan

Background

John Doe brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, a federal law that allows courts to review certain agency decisions. He challenged the Administrative Appeals Office’s February 27, 2019 decision affirming USCIS’s denial of his Form I-212 application for permission to reapply for admission after removal.

The opinion states that Doe entered the United States without inspection several times, was removed in 2003, and then remained in Mexico for more than ten years. In 2014, he arrived at a port of entry, requested asylum, and was later paroled into the United States for humanitarian reasons. The court noted that parole does not count as an admission under the immigration statute.

Doe later filed applications connected to obtaining lawful permanent resident status, including the Form I-212 application. USCIS denied that application because it concluded that a person inadmissible under the relevant immigration provision could not apply while physically present in the United States. The Administrative Appeals Office upheld that decision, relying primarily on Form I-212 instructions and stating that the application had to be filed from abroad.

Parties’ arguments

Doe moved for summary judgment, asking the court to set aside the agency’s decision. He argued that the agency’s physical-presence requirement was contrary to the immigration statute because the statute concerns admission, not merely physical presence. He also argued that the agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation, making its decision arbitrary and capricious.

The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, asking the court to affirm the Administrative Appeals Office’s decision. They argued that the decision was consistent with the statute. They also offered reasons during the litigation that the Administrative Appeals Office had not relied on in its decision, including arguments concerning Doe’s status when he presented himself at the port of entry and the meaning of the statute’s reference to seeking admission from a foreign contiguous territory.

Court’s analysis

The court focused on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), which provides an exception to a specified ground of inadmissibility when a noncitizen has been outside the United States for more than ten years and obtains the Secretary of Homeland Security’s consent to reapply for admission before attempting to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory.

The court concluded that the statute does not say the applicant must seek consent before physically entering the United States. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, “admission” means lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. The court found that admission and physical presence are distinct concepts, and the defendants conceded that they are not synonymous. Because parole is not an admission, the court held that the statute does not impose a requirement that a noncitizen be physically outside the country before seeking consent to reapply.

The court also held that deference to the Administrative Appeals Office’s interpretation was unwarranted. The agency did not analyze the statutory language or explain how the form instructions represented a valid interpretation of the statute. Its decision instead relied on the instructions and made a conclusory statement about the absence of a regulation authorizing adjudication of an application filed in the United States.

In addition, the court declined to consider the defendants’ new litigation arguments. Under the rule commonly associated with the Supreme Court’s Chenery decisions, an agency decision generally must be judged on the reasoning the agency itself gave. The court therefore would not uphold the decision on grounds the agency had not invoked.

Disposition

The court concluded that the Administrative Appeals Office’s requirement that Doe file the Form I-212 application from abroad was contrary to law and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Because it resolved the case on that ground, it did not reach Doe’s separate argument that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.

The court granted Doe’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. It denied the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. The parties were ordered to meet and confer and submit a stipulated proposed judgment within 14 days of the order.