Richardson v. Berryhill
- Robert Illman
- 1:19-cv-01489
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 22
In Richardson v. Berryhill, Judge Illman reversed the disability denial and ordered immediate calculation and payment of benefits.
Eugene Richardson, whose denial of supplemental security income was reversed and whose case was remanded for immediate calculation and payment of benefits; the Commissioner of Social Security, whose motion for summary judgment was denied.
What happened
In Richardson v. Berryhill, Eugene Richardson asked the court to review the denial of his application for supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that Richardson could perform simple work despite his traumatic brain injury, cognitive problems, depression or adjustment disorder, and cannabis use.
The court ruled that the administrative law judge improperly rejected treating psychologist Richard Wanlass’s detailed evaluation and failed to properly consider testimony from Richardson’s mother, Angela Jackson. The court found that this evidence showed limitations serious enough to meet disability criteria or prevent competitive employment.
Judge Illman granted Richardson’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s motion, reversed the finding that Richardson was not disabled, and remanded the case for the immediate calculation and payment of benefits.
The detailed version
- Richardson v. Berryhill · No. 1:19-cv-01489
- Robert Illman
- June 16, 2020
Background
Eugene Richardson sought judicial review of an administrative law judge’s decision denying his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The administrative law judge found that Richardson had severe impairments related to a traumatic brain injury, a depressive or adjustment disorder, and cannabis abuse. The administrative law judge determined that Richardson could perform work at all exertional levels if limited to simple one- and two-step instructions, related tasks, and no required public interaction. At the final step of the disability analysis, the administrative law judge found that Richardson could perform jobs such as laborer, transportation cleaner, and housekeeping cleaner.
Richardson challenged the decision on four grounds: the weighing of medical opinions, the rejection of his testimony, the rejection of lay-witness testimony, and the finding that other work was available. The Commissioner argued that the administrative law judge reasonably resolved conflicts between the medical opinions and that substantial evidence supported the decision.
Medical and Lay Evidence
Richardson had suffered a traumatic brain injury in a serious automobile accident. Treating psychologist Richard Wanlass conducted an extensive evaluation involving 29 diagnostic tests. Wanlass identified major neurocognitive disorder caused by traumatic brain injury, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder with predominantly inattentive presentation, a specific learning disorder, and adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. He found serious limitations in processing speed, working memory, attention, learning, memory, communication, and manual dexterity. He opined that Richardson’s cognitive limitations would prevent competitive employment and that Richardson would continue to need family supervision and assistance with medication, appointments, meals, transportation, and finances.
A one-time examining consultant, Paul Martin, measured a somewhat higher full-scale intelligence score and described Richardson’s memory difficulties as relatively minor. Medical expert Carlos Kronberger gave more weight to Martin’s assessment and questioned aspects of Wanlass’s evaluation, including the role of Richardson’s mother’s reports and the possible effect of cannabis use.
Richardson’s mother, Angela Jackson, testified that Richardson needed frequent reminders about medication, eating, hygiene, and other daily activities. She also described his difficulty remembering work tasks and stated that he had been terminated from a job after forgetting tasks. The administrative law judge did not expressly reject or meaningfully discuss the important portions of Jackson’s testimony.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that the administrative law judge improperly rejected Wanlass’s opinion. The administrative law judge relied on the mistaken belief that Wanlass had focused only on Richardson’s ability to attend college, even though Wanlass expressly stated that Richardson’s cognitive limitations would prevent competitive employment. The court also found that the administrative law judge relied improperly on the small difference between the intelligence scores reported by Wanlass and Martin, without explaining why that difference justified rejecting Wanlass’s opinion. In addition, the administrative law judge incorrectly stated that Wanlass had failed to consider Richardson’s cannabis use.
Because Wanlass’s opinion was well supported by accepted testing methods and was not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence, the court concluded that it was entitled to controlling weight. The court also held that the administrative law judge failed to provide the specific and appropriate reasons required to reject Jackson’s competent testimony about Richardson’s symptoms and daily limitations. The court therefore credited both Wanlass’s opinion and Jackson’s testimony as true under the governing Ninth Circuit rule.
Disposition
The court concluded that, with the improperly rejected evidence credited, Richardson’s traumatic-brain-injury-related neurocognitive disorder clearly met the criteria for Listing 12.02, which concerns neurocognitive disorders. The court also stated that the evidence likely satisfied Listing 12.04, concerning depressive and related disorders. Alternatively, the credited evidence established that Richardson had no residual functional capacity for work. The vocational expert had testified that a person unable to complete job tasks for 16 to 20 percent of each workday would not be competitively employable.
The court granted Richardson’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. It reversed the administrative law judge’s finding of non-disability and remanded the case for the immediate calculation and payment of benefits.
Read the full 22-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.