Sullivan v. Storer Transit Systems

Background

Fatima Sullivan alleged that injuries to her left knee and right hand substantially limited activities including walking, standing, sleeping, and working. She claimed that, while returning by Storer bus from Graton Resort & Casino, she sat in the front priority-seating area to reduce the walking and grasping required to reach seats farther back. Sullivan alleged that the driver told her she could not sit there because she did not have a walker or cane, called security, and caused her to leave the bus. She also alleged that a passenger who was not disabled was later allowed to use the priority seating.

Sullivan’s first amended complaint asserted three claims: disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, disability discrimination under sections 54 and 54.1 of the California Civil Code, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court had previously dismissed her original complaint but allowed her to amend it.

Storer’s Arguments

Storer moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that its later policy changes had made Sullivan’s request for injunctive relief moot. Storer stated that it had changed its policy in December 2018 to allow anyone who self-identified as disabled to use the disability seating area, communicated the change to drivers, trained drivers, and added headrest covers to certain seats.

Storer also moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It argued that Sullivan had not adequately alleged that she was disabled under the ADA or that Storer discriminated against her because of a disability. Finally, Storer moved under Rule 12(f) to strike Sullivan’s request for compensatory damages under the ADA.

Mootness and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The court denied Storer’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. It explained that voluntary cessation of challenged conduct generally does not make a request for injunctive relief moot unless the defendant meets a demanding burden of showing that the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to happen again.

The court held that Storer had not met that burden. The policy changes, employee training, and headrest covers were reversible and did not establish that a driver could not again reject a passenger’s claim of disability. The court also found that the headrest covers did not address Sullivan’s allegation that the driver rejected her claim that she was disabled. Accordingly, Storer’s voluntary compliance did not make Sullivan’s claim moot, and the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was denied.

Failure to State a Claim

The court also denied Storer’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. At the pleading stage, Sullivan did not have to prove her allegations, but she had to allege facts supporting the elements of an ADA public-accommodations claim. The court found that her allegations about her knee and hand injuries, medical treatment, knee buckling, physician’s description of advanced osteoarthritis, disability placard, and claimed limitations on major life activities plausibly alleged that she was disabled under the ADA.

The court further found that Sullivan plausibly alleged discrimination. She alleged that Storer denied her access to disability seating because the driver did not believe she was disabled and that a nondisabled passenger was later allowed to sit there. The court stated that refusing access to disability seating can be actionable discrimination.

The court also concluded that the complaint could be understood to allege that Storer failed to make a reasonable policy change for a passenger with a non-obvious disability. Sullivan plausibly alleged that allowing her to use the reserved seating was necessary for full and equal enjoyment of the bus service, could likely be accomplished without an undue burden, and would not fundamentally alter Storer’s transportation services. The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was denied.

Motion to Strike Damages Request

The court denied Storer’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike Sullivan’s request for compensatory damages. The court agreed that compensatory damages are not available under the ADA itself, but explained that an ADA violation is also a violation of the California statutes Sullivan invoked, and those statutes allow damages. The court found little value in striking the request merely because the amended complaint did not identify every statute supporting potential damages.

Disposition

The court denied Storer’s motion to dismiss and strike. Specifically, it denied the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, denied the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and denied the motion to strike.