Burton v. See's Candy Inc.
- Jeffrey White
- 4:20-cv-00564
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Burton v. See’s Candy Inc., Judge Spero granted fee-waiver status but ordered Burton to explain why her discrimination complaint should not be dismissed.
Veleda Burton received permission to proceed without paying filing fees but had to respond to the court’s order to show cause or file an amended complaint. The defendants were not required to answer the existing complaint under this order, and the court identified limits on which defendants could be sued under the asserted laws.
What happened
In Burton v. See’s Candy Inc., Veleda Burton, representing herself, alleged that See’s Candy Inc. and others discriminated against her because of race and retaliated after she complained. She brought claims under federal Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.
The court granted Burton permission to proceed without paying filing fees. But it ordered her to show why her complaint should not be dismissed because it was difficult to follow, appeared unfinished, and did not provide the short and plain statement required by court rules. The court also identified concerns about suing individual lawyers and a law firm under these laws and about whether Burton had completed the required California administrative process.
Burton had until September 14, 2020, to file an amended complaint or explain why her existing complaint was sufficient. The court also continued the initial case-management conference. The order was signed by Judge Joseph C. Spero.
The detailed version
- Burton v. See's Candy Inc. · No. 4:20-cv-00564
- Jeffrey White
- July 28, 2020
Background
Veleda Burton, proceeding without a lawyer, applied for permission to proceed without paying filing fees. The court granted that application. Burton sued See’s Candy Inc.; United Food and Commercial Union Local 5; the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union; David Rosenfeld; Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld; and Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.
Burton asserted race-discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The opinion describes her basic allegations as involving her work as a candy sales clerk for See’s in El Cerrito, California. She alleged that African American employees were treated less favorably in promotions, discipline, scheduling, support, performance reviews, training, and information about job vacancies. She also alleged that the unions failed to pursue grievances and that Rosenfeld and Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld did not represent her interests.
The court described Burton’s 52-page complaint as difficult to follow and apparently unfinished. It contained notes to herself, placeholders, incomplete statements, and portions that were not coherent. Some allegations also appeared to refer to class-action requirements, although the court said Burton did not clearly state that she intended to represent a class.
Court’s Analysis
Because Burton was permitted to proceed without paying filing fees, the court was required to screen her complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). That screening rule requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, or seek money from a defendant protected from such relief. The court also applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a complaint to contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
The court explained that a self-represented plaintiff’s allegations are read liberally, but the complaint still must include factual allegations that plausibly support the requested relief. The court did not decide whether Burton’s discrimination and retaliation claims ultimately had merit. It stated that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used at the summary-judgment stage does not govern the pleading stage, but a complaint must still include enough nonconclusory facts plausibly connecting an adverse action to discrimination or retaliation.
The court identified several issues for any amended complaint. First, it ordered Burton to address the complaint’s failure to provide a short and plain statement. Second, it stated that Title VII and the Fair Employment and Housing Act do not permit the claims described in the order against individual defendants Rosenfeld and Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld. The court said Burton should assert the claims only against her employer and/or union. It also said it was unclear whether Burton intended to allege that Berkshire Hathaway was her employer or an alter ego of See’s.
Third, the court found that Burton had alleged receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but that such a letter generally supports a Title VII claim and does not substitute for the separate California administrative requirements for a Fair Employment and Housing Act claim. Burton had not alleged that she received a right-to-sue letter from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing or that a year passed without that agency acting on her claim.
Disposition
The court granted Burton’s application to proceed without paying filing fees. It ordered Burton to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed by September 14, 2020, either by filing an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies or by filing a response arguing that the current complaint was sufficient. The court did not dismiss the complaint in this order. It stated that failure to respond would lead to reassignment to a United States district judge with a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The court continued the initial case-management conference to October 30, 2020, and the order was signed by Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.