Torrence v. Neuschmid

Background

Willie A. Torrence filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his California convictions for first-degree murder, first-degree attempted murder, shooting from a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found firearm, gang, and prior-prison-term enhancements true. Torrence received a sentence of 121 years to life. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and later affirmed the sentence after the case was returned for consideration of whether firearm enhancements should be struck. The California Supreme Court denied review.

The federal court reviewed the state-court decisions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Under that law, federal relief was available only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Confrontation Clause and Gang-Expert Testimony

Torrence argued that Lieutenant Tony Jones’s testimony about earlier police contacts involving Torrence and codefendant Lawrence Denard was testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The court assumed that the testimony might have been improperly admitted but held that the California Court of Appeal reasonably found any error harmless. Other evidence strongly established Torrence’s gang membership, the gang-related nature of the shooting, his connection to the car and shooting, and his support for Denard’s conduct. The jury’s deliberations lasted less than six hours after a 29-day trial, which the court also viewed as supporting harmlessness.

Torrence separately challenged Jones’s answer to a hypothetical question suggesting that a gang-member driver would know that a gang-member passenger had a gun and intended to shoot. The court held that this answer was not testimonial hearsay because Jones was giving an expert opinion rather than transmitting an out-of-court statement about past events. The court added that any error would have been harmless in any event.

Videos From Denard’s Cell Phone

Torrence argued that videos from Denard’s cell phone violated the rule protecting defendants from the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminating confession at a joint trial. The court rejected the argument because the videos were made for Denard and his associates, not to establish facts for a later prosecution. They therefore were not testimonial statements to which that rule applied.

Torrence also argued that admitting the videos, failing to sever the trials, or failing to give a limiting instruction violated due process. The court held that the videos had probative value on whether the 69th Village was a criminal street gang and whether the charged crimes were connected to that gang. Their admission did not make Torrence’s trial fundamentally unfair.

Evidence of Prior Domestic Violence

Torrence challenged the admission of evidence that he had previously committed domestic violence against his girlfriend, Desiree Trailor. The state court had held that the evidence was admissible under state law to explain Trailor’s reluctance or evasiveness as a witness. The federal court explained that state-law evidentiary errors alone do not support federal relief and that the Supreme Court has not held that admission of propensity or prejudicial evidence, by itself, violates due process.

The court held that the evidence could support permissible inferences about why Trailor might have withheld information or testified untruthfully. It also held that, even if admitting the evidence had been a constitutional error, the error was harmless because the evidence was limited, concerned a collateral credibility issue, was accompanied by a limiting instruction, and did not substantially influence the verdict.

Statements During Jail Booking

During an earlier jail intake interview, Torrence identified himself as a member of the 69th Village and identified his subset as the Bannon Boys. Torrence argued that admitting those statements violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and California law. The state appellate court and the federal court treated any error as harmless.

The federal court explained that routine booking questions generally do not require Miranda warnings, but the exception does not apply when officers should have known a question was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating response. The court nevertheless held that the state court reasonably found no prejudice because Torrence’s gang membership was established by other evidence, including his tattoos, social-media material, and jail writings. The court denied relief on this claim.

Accessory-After-the-Fact Instruction

Torrence argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on accessory-after-the-fact liability because the jury could have found that he did not know in advance that his passenger would shoot but continued driving after learning of the shooting. The California Court of Appeal treated accessory-after-the-fact liability as a lesser-related offense rather than a lesser-included offense and found no federal constitutional requirement for the instruction.

The federal court held that there was no clearly established Supreme Court law requiring an instruction on a lesser-related offense in a noncapital case. Because Torrence received instructions on murder, attempted murder, and aiding-and-abetting liability, the refusal to give the requested instruction did not warrant federal relief.

Cumulative Error and Disposition

Torrence argued that the combined effect of the alleged errors made the trial fundamentally unfair. The court identified two assumed constitutional errors: the admission of some gang expert testimony and the admission of Torrence’s jail-booking statement. It held that the remaining evidence was so strong that these errors did not cumulatively produce an unfair trial.

The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the merits. It also denied a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. The clerk was directed to close the file.