Ruiz v. Spearman

Background

Ignacio Ruiz filed a federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Contra Costa County conviction. A jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of first-degree murder, active participation in a criminal street gang, and related firearm and special-circumstance allegations. The trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life and two consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole.

Before trial, the district attorney offered to drop the other charges and enhancements if Ruiz pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and received two concurrent sentences of 15 years to life. Ruiz rejected the offer, which remained open until trial. He then went to trial and received the much harsher sentence.

Legal standard

The court applied the federal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington. Ruiz had to show that his lawyers’ performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that their errors probably affected the result. Because this was a federal challenge to a state conviction, the court also applied the highly deferential standard under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which permits relief when the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or unreasonably determined the facts.

For incorrect advice that causes a defendant to reject a plea, the court explained that the defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer, the court would have accepted it, and the resulting conviction or sentence would have been less severe.

Cooper’s advice

Kellin Cooper represented Ruiz before November 2010, more than a year before the February 2012 plea offer. Cooper said he would have advised against an indeterminate sentence because he did not believe a defendant with gang allegations had a realistic chance of parole. But the evidence did not show that Cooper advised Ruiz about the specific offer, or even that Cooper communicated such advice about any plea offer. The court therefore found no deficient performance by Cooper and rejected relief based on that portion of the claim.

Cook’s advice about parole

Daniel Cook represented Ruiz when the plea offer was made and during trial. Ruiz stated that he wanted to accept the 15-years-to-life offer but that Cook told him he had never heard of a person serving a life sentence being paroled and recommended going to trial. Cook did not deny giving that advice.

The court reviewed evidence that parole grants for people serving life sentences had increased after changes in California law, and that parole decisions focused on whether the person would pose an unreasonable danger to society if released. The evidence did not establish the precise likelihood that someone in Ruiz’s circumstances would receive parole, but it suggested that his chance was meaningful and likely higher than the approximately six-percent figure cited for murder cases in 2010. The court concluded that telling Ruiz he had no chance of parole was a grossly inaccurate description that undermined his ability to make an informed decision about the plea. It held that this advice constituted ineffective assistance under the first part of the Strickland test.

Cook’s advice about the jury instruction

Ruiz also said Cook advised him that the jury would receive an accessory-after-the-fact instruction, giving jurors an intermediate choice between acquittal and conviction for first-degree murder. California law, however, required the prosecutor’s consent for that lesser-related instruction. The California Supreme Court had changed the law in 1998, but Cook asked for the instruction at trial while relying on the older rule. The trial transcript supported Ruiz’s account that Cook misunderstood the law.

The court held that Cook’s mistaken legal advice was not a strategic choice and fell below reasonable professional standards. The court also found the error important because the jury otherwise had only the choices of acquittal or conviction for first-degree murder, and the jury deliberated for three days before convicting Ruiz.

Prejudice and remedy

The court found a reasonable probability that Ruiz would have accepted the plea if he had received accurate advice about both the possibility of parole and the risks of going to trial. The prosecutor had kept the offer open until trial, so the government would not have withdrawn it if Ruiz had accepted. The court also found no doubt that the trial court would have accepted the plea, because it had accepted similar pleas from Ruiz’s co-defendants.

The court concluded that Ruiz was denied effective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced by it. It granted the habeas petition and ordered the Contra Costa County District Attorney to reinstate the February 18, 2012 plea offer.