McGhee v. Diaz

Background

Tijue Adolphus McGhee, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against people acting under state authority for violating federal rights. He sued Scott Kernan, Ralph Diaz, Ron Davis, Ronald Broomfield, Judy Wayne, Allison Eberly, and Deputy Attorney General Brian C. Kinney.

McGhee alleged that prison officials refused to refer him to the parole board in July 2017 and July 2018. He alleged that the officials relied on a policy under Proposition 57 that denied parole consideration to nonviolent second-strike inmates who had a rules violation or a term in the prison’s Security Housing Unit during the prior five years. McGhee alleged that he successfully challenged that interpretation in state court and was referred for parole consideration on July 30, 2019, but that the parole board did not provide a decision within the required 50 days.

He asserted claims based on the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought a declaration that defendants violated his constitutional rights, injunctions requiring certain defendants to stay away from him and not retaliate against him, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.

Screening standard

Because McGhee was a prisoner suing governmental officials, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage, the court had to identify claims that could proceed and dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, insufficiently pleaded, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also applied the requirement that a complaint contain enough factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief.

Court’s reasons

The court gave several independent reasons for dismissal:

1. Declaratory relief was moot. A declaratory judgment cannot be used to decide a dispute that is no longer live. The state courts had already found invalid the basis for refusing to refer McGhee for parole consideration in 2017 and 2018. The court therefore held that his request for a declaration about the regulations used during those years was moot.

2. Damages were barred. The court held that McGhee’s claims for damages against defendants in their individual capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

3. The requested injunction did not address the alleged violation. McGhee sought an order requiring Diaz, Broomfield, Wayne, Eberly, and Kinney to stay away from him and not retaliate against him. The court held that this requested relief would not remedy the alleged refusal to refer him for parole consideration in 2017 and 2018. The court cited the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that prospective relief be narrowly drawn and no more intrusive than necessary to correct a federal-rights violation.

4. Kinney had prosecutorial immunity. The court held that Kinney’s challenged statement was a legal argument made in an informal response on behalf of the California Board of Parole Hearings. Because Kinney made the statement in his official capacity as a prosecutor, the court held that he was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.

5. The complaint did not state a cognizable constitutional claim under Section 1983. The court held that the refusal to refer McGhee for parole consideration had no connection to his First Amendment right to petition the government, and noted that he had successfully used the courts to challenge the refusal. The equal-protection claim failed because McGhee’s status as a nonviolent second-strike inmate with a recent rules violation or Security Housing Unit term was not a protected classification, and the alleged regulations were motivated by public-safety concerns rather than discriminatory intent. The Sixth Amendment claims failed because the rights to compulsory process and appointed counsel apply to criminal prosecutions, not prison proceedings. The Eighth Amendment claim failed because McGhee challenged the denial of parole consideration, not prison conditions.

The court also rejected McGhee’s substantive due-process theory. It explained that there is no federal constitutional right to release on parole before a valid sentence ends and that, although California law creates a liberty interest requiring procedural protections at parole hearings, it does not create a federal substantive-due-process right to parole consideration.

Additional allegations and disposition

McGhee filed additional pleadings alleging that prison officials had recently interfered with his legal mail, retaliated against him for accessing the courts, and failed to provide adequate court access. The court stated that he had to raise those alleged violations in a separate action.

The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It denied all pending motions as moot and directed the clerk to send McGhee two copies of the court’s civil-rights complaint form.