Hall v. Amtrak, National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Background

Randy Lee Hall brought a survival and wrongful-death action after his daughter, Dejani Hall, was struck and killed by an Amtrak passenger train near railroad tracks in Merced, California. BNSF Railway Company owned the tracks. Jonathan Staska operated the train, while Hogg and Michael Torrence performed passenger-related duties in trailing cars.

The train was traveling within federal speed limits. After passing a crossing, Staska saw Hall walking along the track, sounded the horn, and began applying the service brake. Hall was wearing headphones and did not respond. Staska applied the emergency brakes fifteen seconds after seeing her, and the train struck her three seconds later while traveling 36 miles per hour.

Hall’s operative complaint asserted negligence, a dangerous-condition or premises-liability claim, and wrongful death. By the time of the motions, he pursued negligence against Amtrak and Staska and premises liability against BNSF. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which is a decision before trial available when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result.

Negligence claim

Hall advanced theories based on excessive speed, failure to slow or stop, and failure to render aid. He conceded that the excessive-speed theory was preempted, meaning federal law displaced that state-law theory, and he did not oppose the defendants’ arguments concerning failure to render aid. The court therefore granted summary judgment for all defendants on those theories. It also granted summary judgment for BNSF, Hogg, and Torrence on the failure-to-slow-or-stop theory because they did not operate the train.

The remaining negligence theory alleged that Staska should have applied the emergency brakes sooner. The defendants argued that federal railroad law preempted this claim unless an imminent, specific hazard had arisen. The court rejected that argument. It explained that the cited Supreme Court decision addressed excessive-speed claims, not a claim about the engineer’s conduct after seeing a particular person in the train’s path. The court denied the defendants’ request to hold the remaining claim preempted.

Under California law, the court stated, railroad personnel must use reasonable care in light of the circumstances and probable danger. Whether Staska’s conduct was reasonable ordinarily presented a fact question. The court concluded that a jury could find that his assumption that Hall would respond to the horn was initially reasonable but became unreasonable after she failed to react. The court also concluded that the defendants had not shown that no reasonable jury could find that Staska breached his duty or that earlier braking could have avoided the collision. Summary judgment on this negligence claim against Amtrak and Staska was denied.

Premises-liability claim

Premises liability is a type of negligence involving an owner or controller’s duty to use reasonable care in managing property. The court found that BNSF, not Amtrak, owned the railroad track and right-of-way, and that Hall offered no evidence that Amtrak controlled them. The court therefore ruled that Amtrak could not be liable on the premises-liability claim.

As to BNSF, Hall alleged that it failed to warn about dangerous conditions. The court agreed with the defendants that the danger of being struck by a train while walking along railroad tracks was obvious. It ruled that BNSF owed no duty to warn under the circumstances and granted summary judgment for BNSF on the premises-liability theory. The conclusion also states that summary judgment was granted for Staska on the premises-liability claim.

Punitive damages

Punitive damages require more than proof of a tort. The plaintiff must present evidence of aggravating conduct, such as malice or a deliberate disregard for others’ interests. The court found that Hall did not provide such evidence and that the defendants presented evidence that Staska sounded the horn and began applying the service brakes promptly after seeing Hall. The punitive-damages claim did not survive.

Survival claim

A survival claim allows a decedent’s claim to continue after death, but it cannot be maintained if the injury and death occurred simultaneously. The defendants presented medical evidence supporting instantaneous death. Hall presented police reports indicating that an officer believed Hall appeared to be breathing and performed CPR. The court accepted those observations as potentially provable through appropriate witnesses and held that a jury had to decide whether Hall survived for any period of time. The court also relied on its earlier ruling that the survival claim related back to the original wrongful-death claim and was timely.

Disposition

Judge William Alsup granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for Hogg and Torrence on all claims; for BNSF on the negligence claims; for Amtrak on the premises-liability claim; and for Staska on the premises-liability and failure-to-render-aid claims. The court denied summary judgment on the claim against Amtrak and Staska based on negligent failure to slow or stop the train. The survival claim survives, but the punitive-damages claim does not.