Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Inc.
- Beth Freeman
- 5:19-cv-02936
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 2
In Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Judge Freeman denied Arakji’s motion for leave to seek reconsideration because it identified no qualifying new facts, law, or error.
Mazen Arakji’s request for permission to seek reconsideration was denied. The opinion does not describe a direct effect on Microchip Technology, Inc.
What happened
In Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Inc., Mazen Arakji objected to an order denying his request for relief from a magistrate judge’s pretrial order. The court treated his objection as a request for permission to file a reconsideration motion.
Arakji argued about the meaning of language in a federal disclosure rule and the 1993 advisory committee notes concerning that rule. The court said he did not identify new material facts, a change in law, or a significant failure to consider facts or legal arguments that had already been presented.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman denied Arakji’s motion. The court also reminded him that reconsideration is generally disfavored and directed him not to file further objections unless they meet the applicable rules.
The detailed version
- Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Inc. · No. 5:19-cv-02936
- Beth Freeman
- Aug. 24, 2020
Background
Mazen Arakji filed an “Objection” to the court’s order denying his motion for relief from a nondispositive pretrial order issued by Magistrate Judge Cousins. The court construed the objection as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7-9.
Applicable standard
Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, a party seeking permission to request reconsideration before final judgment must specifically show reasonable diligence and one of several stated circumstances. These include a material difference in fact or law that was previously unknown despite reasonable diligence, new material facts or a change in law after the earlier order, or a manifest failure by the court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments previously presented. The court explained that granting leave is discretionary and that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally used sparingly.
Arguments and analysis
Arakji did not identify which provision of Rule 7-9(b) supported his motion. He raised two arguments: one concerning “general linguistic semantics” and their application to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), and another concerning his interpretation of the 1993 advisory committee notes on Rule 26.
The court concluded that neither argument identified new material facts, a change in law, or a manifest failure to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. The court also reviewed Arakji’s earlier motion for relief and the magistrate judge’s pretrial order. It found no clear error in the magistrate judge’s factual determinations and no legal conclusion contrary to law. The court stated that Arakji’s linguistic-semantics arguments did not change that determination.
Disposition
The court denied Arakji’s motion at ECF 74. It reminded him that reconsideration motions are generally disfavored, are not a place to raise new arguments that were not made in the original briefs, and should not be used simply to ask the court to rethink its prior decision. The court directed Arakji to refrain from filing further objections unless a motion for reconsideration is appropriate under the applicable local or federal rules and is filed according to those rules.
Read the full 2-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.