Nagy v. United Schutzhund Clubs of America

Background

Zoltan Nagy alleged that the United Schutzhund Clubs of America (USCA) hosts and operates German Shepherd working-dog shows, competitions, and trials, and that Jim Alloway was an officer, director, supervisor, or managing agent of USCA. Nagy alleged that USCA hired him as a performance judge and that, during a 2019 championship, Alloway told him he would never work as a judge “in this country” again. Nagy also alleged that he complained internally about bias and discrimination, that Alloway sought discipline or other adverse action against him, and that USCA suspended him for one year.

Nagy asserted fourteen causes of action, including claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the California Labor Code, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and other state-law theories. He also alleged that USCA had not paid required overtime or minimum wages and had not provided itemized wage statements during the three years before he filed his complaint.

Service of Process

USCA and Alloway moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5), which permits dismissal for insufficient service of process, and Rule 4(m). Nagy argued that good cause existed because defense counsel unreasonably refused to accept service and USCA’s offices were closed during the coronavirus crisis.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that when service is not completed within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day period, it first considers whether the plaintiff showed good cause. Good cause requires at least excusable neglect. The court found that Nagy had not met that standard because defense counsel had no legal obligation to accept service, and USCA’s offices did not close until after the service deadline had passed.

The court then considered whether to exercise its discretion to extend the deadline even without good cause. For USCA, the court found that the relevant factors favored an extension: Nagy’s Title VII claims appeared potentially time-barred, USCA had not shown prejudice from the delay, and USCA had actual notice of the lawsuit by May 26, 2020.

For Alloway, the court likewise found that the Title VII claim against him appeared potentially time-barred, that he had not shown prejudice, and that he appeared to have actual notice of the lawsuit at least by the date he filed the motion.

Disposition

The court denied USCA and Alloway’s motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. It extended the deadline to serve USCA to May 26, 2020, and extended the deadline to serve Alloway and file proof of service to September 4, 2020. The court stated that if Nagy failed to file proof of service by that deadline, it would dismiss the action against Alloway without prejudice under Rule 4(m). The opinion addressed service deadlines, not the merits of Nagy’s underlying claims.