Forsyth v. HP Inc.
- Edward Davila
- 5:16-cv-04775
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 7
In Forsyth v. HP Inc., Judge Davila denied Daniel Cochran’s motion to intervene because the case would not impair his claims and intervention would delay proceedings.
Daniel Cochran was not allowed to join the Forsyth lawsuit. The original plaintiffs and defendants remained the parties to the case, and the order did not decide the underlying age-discrimination claims.
What happened
Forsyth v. HP Inc. is a putative class action alleging that HP’s workforce-reduction plan discriminated against older workers under federal and California law. Daniel Cochran had filed a separate Colorado lawsuit involving related age-discrimination claims and asked to join the California case.
The court concluded that Cochran could protect his Colorado claims separately and could opt out of any nationwide class. The court also found that any possible settlement-related harm was speculative because no settlement had been proposed. It therefore denied intervention as of right. The court separately denied permissive intervention because adding Cochran’s claims would delay the case and prejudice the original parties.
Judge Edward J. Davila issued the order on August 21, 2020. The ruling decided only Cochran’s request to join the lawsuit; it did not decide the underlying age-discrimination claims.
The detailed version
- Forsyth v. HP Inc. · No. 5:16-cv-04775
- Edward Davila
- Aug. 21, 2020
Background
The plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that HP Inc. and other defendants violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and other California laws. The allegations concerned HP’s Workforce Reduction Plan and asserted both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories of age discrimination.
Daniel Cochran separately filed an action in the District of Colorado asserting federal and Colorado age-discrimination claims, a Colorado wrongful-termination claim, and a Colorado Consumer Protection Act claim. His amended complaint proposed a nationwide class and a Colorado class. Cochran then moved to intervene as a plaintiff in Forsyth. Both the existing plaintiffs and the defendants opposed his motion.
Intervention as of Right
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), a person seeking intervention as of right generally must show a significant protectable interest connected to the case, a practical risk that the case will impair the person’s ability to protect that interest, a timely motion, and inadequate representation by the existing parties. Failure to satisfy any one requirement is enough to deny the request.
The court focused on the second requirement. It held that the disposition of Forsyth would not practically impair Cochran’s ability to protect his interests. Cochran was not a member of the state classes alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint, and he could opt out of the nationwide class. The court also found no relationship between the plaintiffs’ California claims and Cochran’s Colorado claims; Cochran himself acknowledged that his proposed Colorado class had not been and would not be represented in Forsyth.
The court rejected Cochran’s argument that a possible settlement could impair his claims. No settlement had been proposed, so that concern was too speculative. The court also noted that, even if a settlement later occurred, Cochran could protect his interests by objecting to it or opting out. The court therefore denied Cochran’s motion to intervene as of right and did not analyze the other requirements.
Permissive Intervention
Cochran alternatively sought permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). This type of intervention may be allowed when the applicant has an independent basis for jurisdiction, a timely motion, and a claim or defense sharing a common legal or factual question with the existing case. Even when those requirements are met, the court has discretion to deny intervention if it would cause undue delay or prejudice.
The court disagreed with Cochran’s assertion that the case was still in its early stages. The action had been underway for forty-eight months. The court reasoned that allowing intervention would bring additional people subject to the same release agreements into the case and require the same pre-arbitration mediation process. It found that intervention would significantly delay the proceedings and prejudice the original parties, without significantly aiding development of the factual or legal issues. The court therefore denied Cochran’s motion for permissive intervention.
Disposition
The court denied Cochran’s request to intervene as a plaintiff, including both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The order did not resolve the underlying age-discrimination claims.
Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.