Gillespie v. County of Alameda

Background

Samuel Gillespie and Suzanne Gillespie sued Alameda County and several identified sheriff’s deputies and supervisors. They alleged civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal statute that allows claims for violations of federal rights by state or local officials, along with California-law claims.

The complaint alleged that deputies came to the Gillespies’ home on August 1, 2019. Samuel was allegedly in the attic with Deputy Matthew Yarborough when a police dog named Queen bit him. The dog continued biting Samuel’s leg after deputies called it off, and Yarborough eventually tackled the dog; both fell through the attic ceiling. Samuel was taken to a hospital and then to Santa Rita Jail, where his injury received six stitches. He remained in jail for 45 days and later required more than two months of critical care after developing a severe infection, sepsis, and cardiomyopathy. Samuel was initially charged with resisting arrest, and Suzanne was charged with obstructing a peace officer and harboring a felon to escape arrest; the charges were later dropped.

Motion to dismiss

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally recognized claim. The court found that the complaint alleged wrongful conduct only by Yarborough and did not clearly identify which other defendants were involved or how supervisors were responsible. It therefore dismissed the complaint as to all individual defendants other than Yarborough. The court also granted dismissal of claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities because those claims duplicated the claims against the County.

The court dismissed the municipal-liability claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services because the complaint did not identify a specific County policy or custom, did not connect that policy or custom to a particular constitutional violation, and relied primarily on a prior case that had settled. The court also dismissed the first claim, which generally alleged constitutional violations under § 1983 without identifying a particular constitutional right or violation.

The court dismissed the fourth claim for unlawful detention because the complaint did not distinguish it from the third claim for unlawful seizure. The court allowed the plaintiffs to amend that claim with distinct factual allegations. The court rejected the defendants’ challenge to negligent infliction of emotional distress as a legal theory, but dismissed Samuel’s claim because the complaint alleged emotional-distress facts only about Suzanne. Suzanne’s corresponding claim was not dismissed on that ground.

As to Suzanne, the court granted dismissal of her second, fifth, eighth, and twelfth claims. It dismissed her ninth claim to the extent it alleged battery, because the complaint did not allege that defendants physically touched her, but allowed that claim to proceed as an assault claim. The court also denied dismissal of her seventh claim under California’s Bane Act to the extent it relied on her assault claim. The court generally granted dismissal of the Bane Act claims, except for Samuel’s assault-and-battery-based claim and Suzanne’s assault-based claim.

The court dismissed Samuel’s twelfth claim under California Government Code section 845.6, which can impose liability when a public employee who knows a prisoner needs immediate medical care fails to take reasonable action to summon that care. The court found that the complaint alleged inadequate treatment, not a failure to summon medical care. The court also dismissed Samuel’s eleventh claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress and dismissed the claims against the County identified in the conclusion as the second, third, and fifth claims.

Disposition

The court stated that the defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to the individual defendants in their official capacities; the first, fourth, sixth, and twelfth claims; the second, third, and fifth claims against the County; the seventh claim except where based on Samuel’s assault and battery claim or Suzanne’s assault claim; Samuel’s eleventh claim; Suzanne’s second, fifth, and eighth claims; and Suzanne’s ninth claim to the extent it alleged battery. The motion was otherwise denied.

Because the court found that amendment might not be futile, it granted leave to amend. The plaintiffs were ordered to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies by September 14, 2020.