S.M. v. Berryhill

Background

S.M. sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for supplemental-security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability beginning January 1, 2015, based on anger issues, migraines, insomnia, and bipolar disorder. After her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, an administrative law judge held hearings and issued an unfavorable decision. The Appeals Council denied review.

The administrative law judge found that S.M. had severe impairments consisting of mood disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance use disorder. He found that she had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her limitations—to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to limitations to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and occasional interaction with the public. Relying on vocational-expert testimony, he found that jobs such as vegetable-harvest worker, cleaner, and racker were available and concluded that S.M. was not disabled.

Issues

S.M. argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated the medical opinions, including the opinion of examining psychologist Paul Martin, Ph.D., and the opinions of non-examining state consultants Tawnya Brode, Psy.D., and Mercedes DeCubas, Ph.D. She also argued that the residual-functional-capacity finding failed to include limitations supported by the record and that the administrative law judge improperly rejected her reported daily activities.

Medical-opinion evidence

The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide the required specific and legitimate reasons for partially rejecting Dr. Martin’s opinion. The administrative law judge said that Dr. Martin’s findings were inconsistent with the state consultants’ opinions, S.M.’s function report, and the medical evidence as a whole, but provided only a conclusory statement and record citations without explaining the conflicts.

The court also found that the administrative law judge did not explain why S.M.’s function reports were inconsistent with Dr. Martin’s findings. The reports described difficulty waking up, concentrating, completing tasks, interacting with others, and taking medication. The administrative law judge did not explain why those reports conflicted with Dr. Martin’s findings that S.M. had marked limitations in completing a normal workday without interruption and dealing with ordinary workplace stress.

The court further held that the administrative law judge mischaracterized the evidence when he concluded that S.M. had not been forthcoming about her substance use. Dr. Martin’s report stated that he knew S.M. had used methamphetamine for about two or three days and that she lived in a sober-living environment. The court therefore found that the administrative law judge had not supplied adequate reasons to discount Dr. Martin’s opinion.

The court also found inadequate the reasons for giving great weight to the opinions of the non-examining psychologists. The administrative law judge said those opinions were supported by and consistent with the record, but did not address apparently conflicting evidence, including a treatment note stating that S.M. heard someone trying to get her attention at night. The court also found conclusory the explanation that the consultants deserved great weight because they were familiar with the record and Social Security criteria.

Residual functional capacity and daily activities

Because the residual-functional-capacity finding relied on medical evidence that the administrative law judge had improperly evaluated, the court ordered reconsideration of the residual functional capacity as well. The court also held that the administrative law judge did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting S.M.’s statements about the severity of her symptoms.

The administrative law judge relied on activities such as preparing meals, driving, cleaning, shopping, paying bills, reading, watching television, visiting family, and caring for a goldfish. But the court found that the administrative law judge did not explain how those activities translated into workplace abilities or why they were incompatible with S.M.’s reported limitations.

Disposition

The court granted S.M.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the order. The court determined that further administrative proceedings could remedy the identified defects and did not direct an award of benefits.