A.H. v. Berryhill

Background

A.H. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision on his Title II disability-insurance-benefits claim. He alleged that he became disabled on August 24, 2015, because of rheumatoid arthritis. The record also included diagnoses of carpal-tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that A.H. was not disabled before September 12, 2017, but became disabled on that date and remained disabled through the date of the decision. Before September 12, 2017, the ALJ assigned an ability to perform light, unskilled work with occasional handling and fingering. Beginning on that date, the ALJ assigned an ability to perform sedentary, unskilled work with occasional handling and fingering. The ALJ found that A.H. could not perform his past relevant work, but that three jobs were available to him before September 12, 2017: usher, counter clerk, and tanning salon attendant.

Issues and Analysis

A.H. argued that the ALJ improperly determined the disability-onset date, rejected his testimony, rejected his wife’s statement, and relied on insufficient evidence at the final step of the disability analysis.

Onset date. The court held that the ALJ’s determination that disability began on September 12, 2017, was not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ appeared to rely on a September 12, 2017 electromyogram and nerve-conduction study identifying carpal-tunnel syndrome. But the ALJ had also found that carpal-tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia were severe impairments beginning on the alleged onset date of August 24, 2015. The record also contained earlier evidence of carpal-tunnel syndrome, including a March 2015 examination and a diagnosis by Dr. Lin the following day. The court rejected the Commissioner’s request to interpret the ALJ’s decision as meaning that the condition only became severe in September 2017. The court said that, if the onset date remained unclear on remand, the ALJ should consult a medical expert.

A.H.’s testimony. The ALJ accepted that A.H.’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his symptoms. Because the ALJ did not find evidence of malingering, the ALJ needed specific, clear, and convincing reasons to reject A.H.’s testimony about the severity of those symptoms. The court found that the ALJ properly relied on certain daily activities, including babysitting, going to the gym, physical-therapy exercises, hunting, boxing, swimming, and jumping rope. But the court held that the ALJ’s additional reliance on “routine” and “conservative” treatment was insufficient. The ALJ did not define conservative treatment, did not identify records showing that more aggressive treatment was appropriate or available, and did not account for evidence that A.H. did not respond well to treatment or medication.

A.H.’s wife’s statement. The court held that the ALJ failed to provide specific reasons related to the witness for discounting A.H.’s wife’s statement. The court rejected the reasons that she was not a medical professional, that she was biased because she had a financial interest in A.H. receiving benefits, and that the medical evidence did not fully support her statements. The court explained that a lay witness need not be a medical professional, bias cannot be presumed solely from a family relationship, and the ALJ had inaccurately or incompletely characterized some of the wife’s descriptions of A.H.’s activities.

Step-five finding. The court remanded for reconsideration of the final step because the testimony of A.H. and his wife affected the analysis of whether jobs existed in significant numbers that A.H. could perform.

Disposition

The court granted A.H.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order. The court concluded that further proceedings were appropriate to remedy defects in the administrative process and did not direct an immediate award of benefits.