Hendricks v. Jenkins

Background

Hannah Marie Hendricks, formerly imprisoned at the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California, and then imprisoned at the Federal Correctional Institution in Victorville, California, filed a self-represented petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. She challenged the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) determination that she was not eligible for a possible sentence reduction after completing the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP).

Hendricks pleaded guilty in the District of Idaho to possessing methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin with intent to distribute. Her presentence investigation report stated that a dangerous weapon was possessed and recommended a two-level “specific offense characteristic” increase under Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1). The sentencing court adopted that report without change and sentenced her to 60 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

Hendricks completed RDAP on June 29, 2019. During the BOP’s review, a paralegal specialist determined that she was barred from early-release consideration under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii)–(iii) and section 4.b of BOP Program Statement 5162.05. The determination relied on the firearm-related enhancement and the sentencing court’s adoption of the presentence report. A BOP Assistant General Counsel approved the determination.

Hendricks’s Arguments and the Government’s Response

Hendricks argued that the BOP improperly relied on the firearm-possession enhancement, failed to provide a valid rationale for categorically excluding people with such enhancements, and that unlawful firearm possession was not a “crime of violence.” She also raised, or the court understood her allegations to potentially raise, a due-process claim.

The government argued that courts could not review the BOP’s individualized decision to deny early-release consideration. It also argued that any due-process claim lacked merit and that the BOP properly applied its rules to Hendricks’s firearm-related sentencing enhancement.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez v. Davis foreclosed a challenge to the BOP’s categorical exclusion of prisoners based on specific offense characteristics. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), completing RDAP may permit—but does not require—the BOP to reduce a prisoner’s sentence by up to one year. Lopez recognized the BOP’s discretion to exclude prisoners based on prior firearm involvement connected to a felony.

The court explained that the BOP had not determined that Hendricks’s offense was a “crime of violence.” Instead, it placed her in a category of prisoners whose drug offenses involved firearm possession, as shown by the sentencing enhancement, and excluded that category from early-release consideration under the BOP’s discretionary policy. The court ruled that the BOP had authority to make that categorical determination.

The court also addressed judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act generally allows a person harmed by agency action to sue, but not when Congress has barred review or committed the matter to agency discretion. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3625, the court stated, the Administrative Procedure Act’s review provisions do not apply to BOP determinations made under §§ 3621–3624. Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, the court held that it could not review whether the BOP correctly applied its regulations and program statement in making Hendricks’s individualized early-release determination. Review remained available for claims that BOP action violated established federal law, the Constitution, or the BOP’s statutory authority, but the court found that none of those exceptions applied.

The court rejected Hendricks’s argument that the BOP’s categorical rule was arbitrary and capricious. It relied on Ninth Circuit precedent upholding the validity of the relevant regulation and concluded that Hendricks had not shown that the BOP acted contrary to established law or exceeded its authority.

Finally, the court ruled that no due-process violation had been established. It explained that there is no constitutional or inherent right to conditional release before a valid sentence expires. Because § 3621(e)(2)(B) says that a sentence “may be reduced,” the statute gives the BOP discretion rather than creating an entitlement. The court therefore concluded that Hendricks had no protected liberty interest in early release after completing RDAP.

Disposition

The court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the Clerk to close the file. The opinion does not state that the denial was with or without prejudice.