Perez v. DXC Technology Services LLC

Background

Patricia A. Perez brought a proposed class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the federal overtime law, and various California wage-and-hour laws. She alleged that she and proposed class members worked overtime without receiving overtime pay, worked through meal and rest periods, faced unlawful forfeiture of vested vacation pay, and did not receive accurate wage statements. She also asserted a claim for civil penalties under California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).

Perez sued DXC Technology Services LLC (DXC), Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (HPEC), HP Enterprise Services, LLC (HPES), and Enterprise Services, LLC (ES). The opinion states that HPES and ES undisputedly employed Perez. The defendants challenged all claims against HPEC and DXC, arguing that Perez had not alleged facts showing that either entity employed her. They also challenged her PAGA claim against all defendants.

Claims Against HPEC and DXC

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court considered three theories that Perez raised in her opposition and at the hearing: joint-employer liability, integrated-enterprise liability, and successor liability.

The court found that Perez’s allegations did not plausibly show that HPEC or DXC employed her under any of those theories. The appearance of HPEC’s logo on a paystub did not plausibly show that HPEC or DXC controlled her hiring, firing, work schedule, employment records, or wages. The court also found that written policies did not establish control over Perez’s day-to-day employment decisions. The complaint did not allege facts showing centralized labor control, related operations, common management, common ownership, or financial control sufficient to treat the entities as one employer. Finally, Perez did not identify the alleged predecessors that hired her or explain their relationship to HPEC and DXC, and she did not establish that HPEC had employed her, which prevented her successor-liability theory against DXC.

Because this was Perez’s fourth attempt to cure the pleading deficiencies, the court found that further amendment would be futile and prejudicial to HPEC and DXC. The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against HPEC and DXC WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

PAGA Claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss Perez’s PAGA claims against HPEC and DXC without leave to amend because those claims depended on her unsuccessful allegation that HPEC and DXC were her employers.

As to HPES and ES, the defendants argued that Perez had not exhausted PAGA’s administrative requirements. Perez’s 2017 notice to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency did not name HPES or ES. She later submitted an amended notice naming them, but the court noted that she had been employed by Perspecta Enterprise Solutions LLC—not HPES or ES—for more than one year before that amended notice. Perez argued that Perspecta was the same entity under a newer name. Defendants represented that Perspecta was a spin-off rather than the same entity. The court declined to resolve that relationship on the existing record and at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and DENIED the motion to dismiss Perez’s PAGA claim against HPES and ES.

The defendants separately argued that Perez’s PAGA notices did not identify California Labor Code section 212. The court found that the amended notice did not mention or refer to section 212. Because amendment would be futile, the court DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Perez’s PAGA claim for violation of section 212.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered three specific outcomes: (1) the motion to dismiss all claims against HPEC and DXC was GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; (2) the motion to dismiss Perez’s PAGA claim against HPES and ES was DENIED; and (3) the motion to dismiss Perez’s PAGA claim concerning Labor Code section 212 was GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The order terminated the defendants’ motion to dismiss.