Bolds v. Alameda County Sheriff's Department

Background

Terrance E. Bolds filed a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for violations of constitutional or federal rights by people acting under state law. The opinion says Bolds was a civil detainee housed at Coalinga State Hospital and had been housed at Alameda County Jail from January 2016 through July 26, 2018 under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act.

Bolds alleged that Alameda County Sheriff's Department policy placed sexually violent predator detainees in administrative segregation. According to the complaint, those detainees were allowed only three hours per week in the dayroom, and they could shower only during that same limited period. Bolds contrasted those conditions with the greater access to the dayroom, phones, showers, the chow hall, and a vending machine available to detainees outside administrative segregation.

Bolds also alleged that cell doors were sometimes left open at the same time, despite the requirement that sexually violent predator detainees be housed separately from other inmates. He alleged that the Sheriff's Department knew the detainees should have had separate housing and more privileges but did not provide them because the jail did not often house sexually violent predator civil detainees.

Screening analysis

The court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires preliminary screening of a prisoner's case seeking relief from a governmental entity or its employees. At this stage, the court must identify claims that are legally sufficient and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court also said that self-represented pleadings must be read liberally.

The court explained that civil detainees may not be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment. It stated that conditions are presumed punitive when they are more restrictive than those imposed on criminal detainees in comparable circumstances. The court held that, liberally construed, Bolds's allegations stated a cognizable substantive due process claim against the Alameda County Sheriff's Department.

Order

The court ordered the Clerk to issue a summons and directed the United States Marshal to serve the complaint, its attachments, and the order on the Alameda County Sheriff's Department without requiring advance payment of service fees. The court also directed that a courtesy copy be sent to Alameda County Counsel.

The department was ordered to file and serve a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion no later than 91 days after the order was filed, or to notify the court if it believed the case could not be resolved by summary judgment. If it filed a summary-judgment motion, it had to provide the required notice explaining how Bolds could oppose it. Bolds's opposition was due 28 days after the motion, and the department's reply was due 14 days after the opposition. The motion would be submitted without a hearing when the reply deadline arrived.

The order further stated that discovery could proceed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It instructed Bolds to serve court communications on the department or its counsel, keep the court informed of address changes, meet deadlines, and include the case name and number on filings. It warned that failure to prosecute could lead to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).