McGhee v. Broomfield

Background

Tijue Adolphus McGhee, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court reviewed the complaint under the federal statute requiring early screening of prisoner lawsuits against governmental entities or employees.

McGhee alleged that on June 23, 2019, he gave outgoing legal mail addressed to his attorney to correctional officer Wren. He alleged that correctional officer R. Jaime-Daumy took the mail, opened and read it, and made an intimidating remark after McGhee objected. McGhee also alleged that Jaime-Daumy directed obscene jokes and abusive language toward him. He claimed that Wren allowed or observed the reading of the mail and that former Warden Ron Davis failed to investigate, discipline, or properly train the officers. He also named Warden Ronald Broomfield.

McGhee alleged that prison officials delayed returning his grievance, causing his final-level appeal to be rejected as untimely. He asked the court to excuse the requirement that he complete the prison grievance process. He separately requested appointment of counsel.

Screening Rulings

The court held that, liberally construed, McGhee’s allegations that Jaime-Daumy read legal mail addressed to appellate counsel and that Wren allowed this conduct stated potentially valid First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Those claims were allowed to proceed against Jaime-Daumy and Wren.

The court held that McGhee did not state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim because a state prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell. The court stated that the legal-mail allegations were more appropriately considered under the First, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments.

The court dismissed with prejudice McGhee’s claims based on Jaime-Daumy’s harassment, abuse, and intimidation. It explained that verbal harassment and abusive language, without more, do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The court dismissed Broomfield and Davis from the action with leave to amend. It explained that allegations based only on failing to investigate, failing to discipline, supervising employees, or generally failing to train were insufficient without specific facts connecting each supervisor to the alleged constitutional violation. The court stated that McGhee might be able to correct this problem through amendment.

Pending Motions

The court denied as premature McGhee’s request to excuse the exhaustion requirement. It stated that whether McGhee exhausted available administrative remedies, or whether those remedies were unavailable, could not be decided at that stage on the existing record.

The court denied McGhee’s request for appointment of counsel because exceptional circumstances were not shown. The court found that the likelihood of success was unclear, McGhee had presented his claims effectively, and the issues were not particularly complex. The denial was without prejudice to the court appointing counsel at a later date if circumstances warranted it.

Directions and Effect

The court gave McGhee 28 days from the order’s date to file an amended complaint. If he did not do so, the original complaint would remain operative and Broomfield and Davis would be dismissed. The court directed the United States Marshal to serve the complaint and order on R. Jaime-Daumy and A. Wren without requiring advance payment of fees. It also set deadlines for a defense summary-judgment or other dispositive motion and for McGhee’s response.

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. signed the order on September 28, 2020. The opinion uses both “Jaime-Daumy” and “Jaime-Dumay” in different places; this summary uses the spelling in the caption and service directive.