Colleen Mary Rohan v. Jill Brown

Background

Oscar Gates was convicted in 1981 of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance and was sentenced to death. After direct appeals and lengthy state and federal post-conviction proceedings, sixteen claims remained deferred or subject to requests for further factual development. This motion sought an evidentiary hearing— a hearing to develop and test evidence—on Claims 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 8D, and 34.

The principal claims concerned whether Gates was competent to stand trial, whether he could knowingly and voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination, and whether his trial lawyers adequately investigated and presented evidence about his mental health. Claim 8D concerned alleged ineffective assistance in investigating and presenting information about the Stevenson family crime ring and prosecution witnesses. Claim 34 argued that Gates’s death sentence should be vacated because he is presently insane.

Legal standard

Because Gates filed his petition before the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the court applied pre-Act standards. Under those standards, a petitioner seeking an evidentiary hearing must show that specific factual allegations, if proven, would entitle him to relief and that the relevant facts had not already been reliably resolved after a full and fair hearing. The court described this as a low but real threshold. Conclusory allegations, issues resolvable from the existing record, and purely legal questions do not require a hearing.

Competency-related claims

The court began with Claim 3A, which alleged that trying Gates while he was incompetent violated due process. A person is competent to stand trial when he can rationally consult with his lawyer and understand both the facts and the proceedings. The court considered evidence of Gates’s lifelong cognitive and psychological difficulties, prior findings that he was legally insane or incompetent, and declarations from lawyers who represented him around the time of trial and on appeal.

The court concluded that this evidence created a substantial doubt about Gates’s competence when he was tried. The evidence included accounts of delusional beliefs and difficulty cooperating with counsel, together with evidence that his trial attorneys’ mental-health evaluations may not have included adequate testing or social-history information. The court also determined that whether Gates’s apparently coherent trial testimony contradicted his claimed incompetence was a factual issue suitable for an evidentiary hearing.

Because the court found a sufficient basis for a hearing on Claim 3A, it also granted a hearing on Claim 4A, concerning whether Gates’s waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court granted hearings on Claims 2B, 3B, and 4B as well, which alleged that trial counsel failed to investigate Gates’s mental health and raise his alleged incompetence. The court did not grant a hearing on Claim 2A because Gates acknowledged that claim had previously been found barred under the rule announced in Teague v. Lane.

Stevenson-ring claim

The court denied a hearing on Claim 8D. Gates alleged that his lawyers should have investigated and presented records and other evidence about the Stevenson family crime ring, prosecution witnesses’ criminal activity and possible bias, and alleged secret deals with witnesses. He argued that this evidence could have avoided the need for him to testify and could have produced a more favorable result.

The court found that the existing record and Gates’s allegations did not show a colorable claim of prejudice. The trial court had repeatedly excluded much of the evidence Gates identified, including prior convictions, a California Department of Justice report, and proposed law-enforcement testimony. The court also found that the allegations that Gates’s testimony harmed his defense were speculative and lacked specific facts showing a reasonable probability of a different trial result. In addition, the jury learned about important aspects of the alleged crime ring through Gates’s testimony and the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence.

Present-insanity claim

The court denied an evidentiary hearing on Claim 34 at that time. Gates conceded, and the respondent agreed, that the claim was not ripe—meaning not ready for judicial review—because his execution was not imminent. The court deferred deciding whether to dismiss Claim 34 without prejudice until final judgment on the petition.

Disposition and schedule

The court granted-in-part and denied-in-part the first motion for an evidentiary hearing. It granted hearings on Claims 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B, and denied hearings on Claims 2A, 8D, and 34. It scheduled an in-person evidentiary hearing for February 1 and 2, 2021, and ordered deadlines for proposed budgets, witness information, a further motion for an evidentiary hearing, and responsive briefing. Judge William Alsup signed the order.