A.P. v. Berryhill

Background

A.P. applied for Social Security disability benefits based primarily on serious mental-health conditions, including major depressive disorder with psychotic features, depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and auditory hallucinations. The record also included periods of alcohol and cocaine use. A.P. presented medical opinions from treating and examining providers describing substantial limitations in concentration, social functioning, attendance, and ability to complete a normal workday.

Administrative law judge Arthur Zeidman found that A.P. had severe major depressive disorder and polysubstance abuse disorder, but concluded that his impairments did not meet a listed impairment. The judge assessed a residual functional capacity allowing simple, routine, repetitive work with several restrictions, including an expected two absences per month. The judge concluded that A.P. could perform past work as a warehouse worker, cleaner, and hand packager, and therefore denied benefits.

Motions and Issues

A.P. moved for summary judgment and asked the court to apply the Ninth Circuit’s “credit-as-true” rule. Under that rule, a court may treat improperly rejected evidence as established when the administrative law judge failed to give legally sufficient reasons for rejecting it, no important issues remain to be resolved, and the record leaves no serious doubt that the claimant is disabled.

The Commissioner conceded that the administrative law judge failed to explain conflicts between the residual functional capacity finding and portions of nurse practitioner Brian Whiteside’s opinions, despite stating that he gave those opinions “good weight.” The Commissioner requested a remand for further administrative proceedings, arguing that the record contained conflicts about A.P.’s substance use, medical opinions, treatment evidence, and credibility.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting treating psychologist Roya Sakhai’s opinions about A.P.’s absences from work. Sakhai opined that A.P. would miss more than three or at least four workdays per month. Whiteside gave a materially similar opinion. The court stated that no medical opinion in the record contradicted those attendance limitations.

The court also found no meaningful conflict between Whiteside’s opinion that A.P. was not entirely precluded from work activities and his opinion that A.P. would miss four days per month. The court understood Whiteside to mean that A.P. could perform some work when present but could not maintain the attendance required for employment. The vocational expert testified that three or more absences per month would preclude work.

The court rejected the argument that additional proceedings were needed to determine whether A.P.’s drug or alcohol use was material to his disability. Social Security rules require evidence showing that a claimant with a co-occurring mental disorder would not be disabled without drug or alcohol use. The court found no medical opinion that A.P. would have better attendance without substance use. Instead, Sakhai and Whiteside stated that his impairments would remain equally severe without substance use, and psychologist Lisa Kalich stated that his symptoms persisted during periods of reported sobriety and decreased use.

The court also concluded that improvement during structured crisis treatment did not establish that A.P.’s mental disorder would improve enough outside that setting. The court found that the record did not support treating substance use as material to A.P.’s impairments under the applicable Social Security rules.

The court further rejected the Commissioner’s reliance on less severe treatment notes, state-agency opinions, and the administrative law judge’s assessment of A.P.’s credibility. It explained that intermittent improvement does not permit an administrative law judge to disregard evidence of recurring severe symptoms. The court also stated that the credibility finding did not undermine the treating providers’ opinions about A.P.’s expected absences.

Disposition

The court concluded that, if Sakhai’s opinion about A.P.’s absences were credited as true, the Commissioner would be required to find A.P. disabled. The court found no need for further administrative proceedings and no serious doubt about disability on the record as a whole.

A.P.’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED. The Commissioner’s motion was DENIED. The case was REMANDED for calculation and award of benefits for a period of disability beginning at the termination of A.P.’s employment in November 2013. The clerk was directed to enter judgment in favor of A.P.