Harrison v. Colvin

Background

Mercedes M. Harrison sought review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. The parties later stipulated to reversal and remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), pursuant to a class-action settlement in a related proceeding involving claims affected by consultative examination reports prepared by Dr. Frank Chen. The court approved the stipulation, remanded the case, and entered judgment for voluntary remand.

The court previously approved a $6,000 award of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. After remand, Harrison received $224,117 in past-due benefits for July 2010 through November 2018. The court also awarded Gerrard $23,700 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for work performed before the district court, after offsetting the earlier $6,000 EAJA award.

Motion and Arguments

Gerrard sought $63,113 under the EAJA for 283.3 hours of work performed at the administrative level between January 21, 2018, and February 2, 2020. She argued that administrative work after a remand can be reimbursed when the court retains continuing jurisdiction. She contended that the court handling the related class settlement retained jurisdiction over Harrison because Harrison was a class member. She also argued that Harrison’s case was a “dual remand” under both the fourth and sixth sentences of § 405(g).

The Commissioner agreed that administrative remand work can be compensable after a sixth-sentence remand, but argued that this case was remanded only under the fourth sentence. The Commissioner maintained that the fourth-sentence remand constituted a final judgment and that the district court did not retain jurisdiction.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that a fourth-sentence remand is a judgment finding that the agency erred in some respect and that such a remand ends the district-court action after the applicable appeal period. A sixth-sentence remand, by contrast, involves a Commissioner-requested remand before answering the complaint or new, material evidence that could not previously have been presented for good cause. A sixth-sentence remand does not constitute a final judgment, and the district court retains jurisdiction during the remand proceedings.

The court assumed without deciding that “dual remands” could be legally permissible. It nevertheless found no dual remand here. The parties’ stipulation, the remand order, and the judgment referred only to a voluntary remand under the fourth sentence. None required the Commissioner to return to the district court with additional findings or otherwise stated that the court would retain jurisdiction. The court therefore rejected the argument that the remand was partly under the sixth sentence.

The court also rejected the argument based on the related class settlement. Although an earlier settlement order had stated that the court reserved continuing jurisdiction over the settlement and its participants, that language was later removed at the parties’ request to avoid confusion. The court found nothing in the settlement agreement or related orders authorizing this court to retain jurisdiction to award EAJA fees for administrative work after Harrison’s fourth-sentence remand. It also stated that whether an individual class member could seek such fees in the related proceeding was not an issue for this court to decide.

Disposition

The court held that no EAJA fees for work performed after remand were available in this action and denied Gerrard’s motion for attorney’s fees. The parties agreed that resolving this motion did not affect Gerrard’s ability to seek attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) for her remand work.