Wolf v. Shaw

Background

Isaac Wolf worked at the University of California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. The union, University Professional & Technical Employees, Communications Workers of America Local 9119 (UPTE), was the exclusive bargaining representative for his bargaining unit. California law did not require Wolf to join the union.

Wolf chose to become a dues-paying member so he could attend member-only meetings and participate in discussions about the union’s bargaining policies. On April 10, 2018, he signed a membership agreement that provided for annual dues payments unless he gave notice during a specified 30-day cancellation period. The agreement also authorized deductions from his wages and provided for a service fee equal to dues if he resigned outside the cancellation period.

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, which held that public-sector unions could not collect agency fees from nonmembers without a valid waiver, Wolf sought to stop deductions. In November 2018, he resigned from UPTE and requested that deductions stop immediately. UPTE accepted his resignation but refused to stop the deductions because his request came outside the agreement’s cancellation period. The University continued the deductions until Wolf canceled during the February 2019 cancellation period. Wolf later left his University employment.

Claims and motions

Wolf sought declarations that continuing to deduct union dues after he asked that they stop violated the First Amendment and that California Government Code section 3583 and related provisions were unconstitutional. He also sought damages from UPTE under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the material facts are not disputed and the law requires judgment for one side. The court stated that the facts were not in dispute.

Federal claims

The court held that Wolf’s requests for declaratory relief were moot. A claim is moot when the dispute is no longer live and the plaintiff no longer has a legally recognized interest in the result. Because Wolf was no longer a state employee or UPTE member, the court found that he lacked such an interest.

The court held that Belgau v. Inslee foreclosed Wolf’s § 1983 damages claim. Belgau held that Janus addressed agency fees imposed on nonmembers, not union dues collected from members who had authorized deductions through private membership agreements. It also held that the government’s ministerial processing of authorized payroll deductions did not constitute the government action required for a § 1983 claim when the alleged harm came from the private agreement.

Applying Belgau, the court concluded that the source of the alleged constitutional harm was the membership agreement between UPTE and Wolf, rather than a state statute or policy. Wolf’s counsel conceded that Belgau directly controlled and foreclosed the § 1983 claim. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the federal claims and denied Wolf’s motion as to those claims.

Proposed state-law claim

Wolf argued that he should still be allowed to pursue damages against UPTE under a state-law theory of mutual mistake of law. The court rejected that argument because Wolf’s complaint sought damages only under § 1983 and did not mention a mutual-mistake claim.

The court explained that a mistake claim is subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires particularized allegations and is intended to give the defendant fair notice of the claim. The complaint did not use the word “mistake,” and its allegations about lack of consent concerned whether Wolf had knowingly and voluntarily waived his First Amendment rights, not whether Wolf and UPTE shared the same mistaken legal belief. The court also stated that Wolf could not introduce a new claim for the first time at the summary-judgment stage instead of seeking permission to amend his complaint earlier.

The court further stated that Wolf had not shown that he would be entitled to damages based on mutual mistake of law. The provided opinion text is incomplete at that point, ending during the court’s discussion of the remedy under California law.

Disposition

The court denied Wolf’s motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. It stated that final judgment would follow. The opinion does not state that either motion was granted or denied with or without prejudice.