Ray v. Cuccinelli

Background

The plaintiffs were 45 foreign nationals holding H-4 visas and married to H-1B visa holders. They alleged that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) unlawfully refused to give them an automatic 180-day extension of their employment authorization documents (EADs) after expiration. They also alleged that USCIS unreasonably delayed their applications to renew work authorization.

The plaintiffs’ immigration filings included Form I-539 applications to extend or change nonimmigrant status and Form I-765 applications to renew employment authorization. USCIS had begun adjudicating the related H-1B, H-4, and EAD applications sequentially rather than concurrently. USCIS also required H-4 applicants to provide biometric information. The plaintiffs alleged that these procedures caused employment gaps, loss of income, and loss of employment-related benefits. They further alleged that the procedures were adopted in bad faith.

Venue

The defendant argued that venue was improper because most plaintiffs did not live in the Northern District of California and because the defendant did not reside there. The court rejected that argument. It held that, in this multi-plaintiff action against federal defendants, venue was proper because six of the 45 plaintiffs lived in the district.

Preliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, which is an order providing temporary relief while a case continues. They asked the court either to require automatic extensions of their employment authorizations or to require USCIS to decide their H-4 status and work-authorization applications within seven days.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs had to show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of equities favored them, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. Because the government was a party, the last two factors were considered together.

The court did not consider the preliminary-injunction claims of 14 plaintiffs whose H-4 and employment-authorization applications had already been approved. The court stated that there was no remaining application for USCIS to be ordered to adjudicate for purposes of the requested injunction.

Automatic-extension claim

The court interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 274a.13(d), which provides for an automatic extension of certain expiring EADs for up to 180 days. The regulation excludes employment-authorization categories that require adjudication of an underlying application or petition before the renewal application can be decided.

The court held that H-4 visa holders do not qualify for the automatic extension under that regulation because their EAD renewals depend on adjudication of the H-1B spouse’s renewal petition and the H-4 visa holder’s own status renewal. The court also relied on the regulatory history, explaining that the Department of Homeland Security had declined to create automatic H-4 work-authorization extensions because doing so could authorize employment for people later found ineligible.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their immigration status was automatically extended during the relevant period. It relied on the regulation stating that H-4 status does not itself confer eligibility for employment authorization. The court concluded that USCIS’s interpretation was not arbitrary and capricious and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on this claim. Because they failed to make that showing, the court did not address the other preliminary-injunction factors for this claim.

Unreasonable-delay claim

The plaintiffs also argued that USCIS unreasonably delayed deciding their EAD renewal applications under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court applied the factors commonly used to evaluate agency delay, including the agency’s method for managing its queue, congressional expectations, the harm caused by the delay, the effect of giving the plaintiffs priority over other applicants, and evidence of bad faith.

The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs faced serious harm from being unable to work or renew driver’s licenses and that this weighed in their favor. It also noted that Congress expressed an expectation that immigration-benefit applications generally be processed within 180 days, although the court found that this did not create a mandatory deadline for these applications.

The court nevertheless found that USCIS used a reasonable first-in, first-out processing method. It also considered the effects of the biometric requirement and the COVID-19-related closure of Application Support Centers. The court held that giving the plaintiffs priority would move other applicants backward in the queue and could interfere with USCIS’s expedited-review process. The plaintiffs had not provided evidence that USCIS adopted the biometric requirement or sequential processing in bad faith.

Balancing the factors, the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their unreasonable-delay claim. Because of that conclusion, it did not address the remaining preliminary-injunction factors for the delay claim.

Expedited discovery

The plaintiffs sought expedited discovery, including interrogatories, document requests, and a possible deposition of a USCIS representative. They wanted information about the officials involved in adopting the biometric requirement and sequential processing, the documents considered, communications, and the reasons for those decisions.

The court denied expedited discovery. It found that the plaintiffs had offered only conclusory allegations of bad faith and had not shown good cause for requiring USCIS to respond within 10 days. The court also noted that the procedures challenged by the plaintiffs complied with the cited regulations and that the current record did not establish unreasonable delay.

Disposition

The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and denied their motion to expedite discovery. It scheduled an initial case-management conference for November 19, 2020, required the defendant to provide updated information about the plaintiffs’ applications in connection with that conference, and stated that the order disposed of docket entries 6 and 12.