Mendoza v. Frauenheim

Background

Marcos Mendoza filed a federal habeas petition, meaning a request for federal review of a state-court custody judgment, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition asserts several constitutional claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and erroneous evidentiary rulings. The motion at issue concerned only Claim 16.

Mendoza was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder in March 2013. He later pursued direct review and state post-conviction proceedings. In June 2019, he asked the state superior court for resentencing under California Penal Code § 1170.95. That request remained pending when the federal court issued this order.

Section 1170.95 was enacted after California changed its murder laws through Senate Bill 1437. The statute allows certain people convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine to seek vacation of their murder convictions and resentencing. Mendoza alleges that his second-degree murder conviction was based on the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine and that he could not be convicted under the amended law.

The motion to dismiss

The government moved to dismiss Claim 16. It argued first that the claim was based on state law and therefore could not support federal habeas relief. It argued alternatively that the federal court should refrain from interfering with the ongoing state resentencing proceeding under the Younger abstention doctrine, a rule that can require federal courts to avoid interfering with certain ongoing state cases. Finally, the government argued that Mendoza had not exhausted Claim 16, meaning that he had not yet presented the claim through the available state appellate process.

Mendoza acknowledged that his current request for resentencing was based on state law. He argued, however, that if the state court denied relief, that denial could violate his federal due-process rights. The state court had not yet ruled on either the resentencing request or whether denying it would violate the Constitution.

Court’s analysis

The court treated the federal petition as mixed because it included Claim 16, which had not yet been exhausted in state court. Mendoza proposed deleting Claim 16, litigating his exhausted claims immediately, and later seeking a pause if necessary. The court declined to proceed with the exhausted claims while Claim 16 was being exhausted because Mendoza cited no authority supporting that approach and because it would promote piecemeal litigation.

The court instead considered whether to stay the entire case. Under Rhines v. Weber, a court may stay a mixed petition rather than dismiss it when the petitioner had good cause for failing to exhaust, the unexhausted claim is potentially meritorious, and there is no indication of intentionally delaying litigation. The government did not dispute good cause or assert that Mendoza had intentionally delayed the case. Its opposition to a stay rested on its argument that the resentencing claim was not cognizable in federal habeas review.

The court rejected that argument as a basis for refusing a stay at this stage. Although the resentencing procedure was based on state law, the court said Mendoza could potentially have a federal due-process claim if the state court denied relief that was warranted under § 1170.95. The court could not say that the possible due-process claim was plainly meritless. It therefore found that a stay under Rhines was appropriate.

Disposition

The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and stayed proceedings so Mendoza could exhaust Claim 16 in state court. The order disposed of Docket No. 10. The court did not decide the ultimate merits of Claim 16, whether Mendoza is entitled to resentencing, or whether a future denial of resentencing would violate federal due process.