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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Dec. 18, 2020

Pacific Recovery Solutions v. United Behavioral Health

Judge
Yvonne Rogers
Docket
4:20-cv-02249
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
19
Civil ProcedureAntitrustErisaMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Pacific Recovery Solutions v. United Behavioral Health, Judge Rogers granted dismissal of federal and some state claims with prejudice while allowing amendment of other state claims.

Who this affects

The ruling affects Pacific Recovery Solutions and the other plaintiffs, including the proposed class of out-of-network intensive outpatient providers. Their Sherman Act and RICO claims, and their state-law claims involving ERISA-covered plans, were dismissed with prejudice; their state-law claims involving plans outside ERISA’s scope may be amended. United Behavioral Health and MultiPlan remain the defendants in the proceedings concerning any permitted amended claims.

What happened

Pacific Recovery Solutions and the other plaintiffs sued United Behavioral Health and MultiPlan over alleged underpayment for intensive outpatient services. They brought claims under the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and California law, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of similar providers.

The court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked the required legal connection to bring the Sherman Act and RICO claims because their alleged losses depended on patients’ failure to pay remaining balances and were too indirect. The court also ruled that the California claims were blocked by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act when they involved claims covered by ERISA plans.

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted dismissal with prejudice for the Sherman Act and RICO claims and for state-law claims involving ERISA-covered plans. She granted dismissal with leave to amend for state-law claims involving plans outside ERISA’s scope, and allowed plaintiffs 30 days to file an amended complaint.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Pacific Recovery Solutions v. United Behavioral Health · No. 4:20-cv-02249
Judge
Yvonne Rogers
Date
Dec. 18, 2020

Background

Pacific Recovery Solutions and the other plaintiffs brought a putative class action against United Behavioral Health and MultiPlan, Inc. The plaintiffs are out-of-network providers that supplied intensive outpatient program services to patients with insurance policies administered by United. They alleged that United represented during verification-of-benefits calls that it would reimburse services at a percentage of the usual, customary, and reasonable rate, but instead used a database and pricing tool to generate rates that resulted in under-reimbursement.

The amended complaint asserted claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), along with California claims for unfair competition, intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, breach of oral or implied contract, and promissory estoppel. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim. They argued that the federal claims failed for lack of statutory standing, that the state-law claims were preempted—displaced by federal law—under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and that the claims remained inadequately pleaded.

Sherman Act claims

The court held that the plaintiffs did not have antitrust standing, meaning the necessary connection between an alleged antitrust violation and the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiffs’ allegations indicated that their losses arose from patients’ failure to pay amounts remaining after United’s reimbursement, rather than directly from the defendants’ alleged conspiracy. The court also found the alleged injury was not the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, was too speculative, and created a risk of duplicate recoveries if both providers and patients sued over the same conduct.

The court therefore granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the Sherman Act claim with prejudice. Because the lack of antitrust standing required dismissal, the court did not reach the defendants’ alternative arguments concerning that claim.

RICO claims

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants used mail and wire fraud to under-reimburse them and violated RICO sections 1962(c) and 1962(d). The court held that the plaintiffs lacked RICO standing because their alleged business or property injury was derivative of, and too remote from, the injuries allegedly suffered by their patients. The court also emphasized the risk of duplicative recoveries and noted that the patients had filed a separate related lawsuit asserting RICO claims based on the same alleged enterprise.

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the RICO claims with prejudice. Because the plaintiffs lacked RICO standing, the court did not address the defendants’ alternative arguments about whether the RICO claims were adequately pleaded.

California claims and ERISA preemption

The court ruled that the state-law claims depended on the existence and terms of the patients’ healthcare plans. To the extent the allegedly under-reimbursed services were covered by ERISA plans, the claims were preempted under ERISA Section 514(a). The court granted the motions to dismiss those state-law claims with prejudice.

The amended complaint also alleged that a large percentage of the plans were not covered by ERISA, but it did not identify which claims involved plans outside ERISA’s scope or explain why. The court granted the motions to dismiss the state-law claims involving plans outside ERISA’s scope with leave to amend. The court stated that plaintiffs could try to plead facts identifying those claims and supporting liability under California law, but could not reassert claims dismissed with prejudice, repeat rejected theories, or add new claims.

Other ruling and disposition

The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply. It allowed the plaintiffs 30 days from filing of the order to submit an amended complaint and allowed defendants 30 days after that filing to respond. Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers ordered that the motions and the sur-reply motion were terminated.

The authoritative version

Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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