dela Cruz v. Brennan

Background

Fernando N. Dela Cruz, representing himself when he filed the original case, sued Megan Brennan, identified in the opinion as Postmaster General, over his previous employment with the United States Postal Service. His third amended complaint asserted one claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging interference with his right to protected medical leave.

Dela Cruz alleged that in January 2016 he experienced severe stress after a supervisor insisted that he drive a vehicle with a defective signal light. A doctor took him off work from January 20 through January 29, 2016. Dela Cruz alleged that a coworker placed the doctor’s note in the sick-leave box, but that the Postal Service later marked him absent without authorization.

Dela Cruz also alleged that after his sister died in August 2016, he requested bereavement leave and was ordered to report to work. He later saw a doctor for stress, insomnia, and grief. The doctor prescribed medication and wrote that Dela Cruz should remain off work from August 10 through August 14, 2016. Dela Cruz alleged that the Postal Service did not ask whether this leave qualified for FMLA protection.

Finally, Dela Cruz alleged that managers later referred to his medical absences as attendance problems and that he was warned, suspended, investigated, and ultimately terminated. He claimed that the Postal Service used his FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor in those employment actions.

Legal standard

The defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally recognized claim. At this stage, the court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and dismisses only when the alleged facts do not support a valid legal theory or do not make the claim reasonably plausible.

To plead FMLA interference, a plaintiff must allege that he was eligible for FMLA protection, that the employer was covered by the law, that he was entitled to leave, that he gave notice of his intention to take leave, and that the employer denied FMLA benefits or took an unlawful action because of the leave. The defendant did not dispute the first two elements for purposes of this motion.

Analysis

January 2016 absence. The court held that Dela Cruz did not adequately allege a serious health condition connected to the January leave. The opinion explains that a condition involving continuing treatment generally requires either two treatments within 30 days of the first day of incapacity or one treatment that results in a continuing-treatment regimen supervised by a health-care provider. Dela Cruz alleged one doctor’s visit in January but did not allege either required form of continuing treatment. His later medical visits in August and November did not satisfy the 30-day requirement described by the applicable regulation. The court therefore concluded that the third amended complaint failed to state an FMLA interference claim based on the January leave.

August 8 bereavement request. The court also held that Dela Cruz failed to state an FMLA interference claim based on his supervisor’s order that he report to work despite requesting bereavement leave. The court relied on decisions holding that bereavement leave or an absence following a family member’s death is not protected by the FMLA. Dela Cruz did not respond to that authority or provide support for treating the bereavement leave as FMLA-protected leave.

August 10–14 medical leave and later discipline. The court reached a different conclusion about the August 10–14 medical leave. Dela Cruz alleged that his doctor took him off work for five days and prescribed medication for insomnia and anxiety. The court held that these allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege a serious health condition because the prescription could qualify as a continuing-treatment regimen.

The court also found that Dela Cruz adequately alleged notice. A coworker allegedly delivered a doctor’s note stating that Dela Cruz was medically off work from August 10 through August 14. The court held that notifying the employer that a doctor had taken him off work for five days was enough to allege that the employer knew the leave might be covered by the FMLA, even though Dela Cruz did not expressly mention the statute.

The court further held that Dela Cruz adequately alleged that the August leave was a negative factor in his termination. He alleged that a supervisor referred to his medical leaves as failures to maintain regular attendance during an October 2016 meeting, after which he was suspended, issued removal notices, and ultimately terminated. He also alleged that he had not previously been reprimanded, warned, disciplined, or suspended. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to state an FMLA interference claim based on the August medical leave.

Timeliness. The opinion explains that an FMLA action generally must be filed within two years after the last event constituting the alleged violation, but the period extends to three years for a willful violation. Dela Cruz filed the action more than two years after his January 2017 termination, so he had to allege that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded whether her conduct violated the FMLA. He alleged reckless indifference and pointed to the failure to inquire about the August leave and the later characterization of that leave as an attendance problem. The provided opinion text is incomplete at the end of this portion of the analysis, but the court’s final order states that the motion was granted in part and denied in part.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint. The opinion’s analysis rejects the portions based on the January 2016 leave and the August 8 bereavement request, while finding that the allegations concerning the August 10–14 medical leave and later employment actions were sufficient to proceed at the pleading stage.