El-Shaddai v. Muniz

Background

Adonai El-Shaddai, also identified as James Ray Wilkerson, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without a lawyer. He alleged that constitutional violations occurred while he was housed at Salinas Valley State Prison. The court initially allowed him to proceed without paying the filing fee.

The court later revoked that status and dismissed the action without prejudice to filing a paid complaint. It concluded that El-Shaddai had brought at least three earlier actions or appeals that counted as dismissals for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), commonly called the prisoner “three-strikes” rule. The court also found that he had not shown that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury, an exception to that rule. The earlier dismissal allowed him to seek reopening within twenty-eight days if he paid the full filing fee, which the opinion states was $350.00.

Motions and arguments

After the twenty-eight-day period passed, El-Shaddai filed a document asking for additional time. The court construed it as a motion for an extension of time to file a motion to reopen and granted the extension retroactively to May 7, 2020, the date he filed his motion to reopen.

El-Shaddai then filed the motion to reopen without the full filing fee. Because the filing sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the court construed it as a motion for reconsideration. He argued that the court had erred in counting two of the prior dismissals as strikes and that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury. The defendants opposed reconsideration, arguing that El-Shaddai was attempting to relitigate the fee-waiver issue and that his arguments about the prior dismissals lacked legal and factual support.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that Rule 60(b) permits relief from a judgment for specified reasons, including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. It stated that dissatisfaction with an order or the belief that the court was wrong is not enough, and that relief generally requires circumstances such as an intervening change in controlling law, new evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice.

The court rejected El-Shaddai’s arguments concerning the first prior dismissal. It found that he had not shown that a later case could cure the earlier dismissal, and that the two cases involved different defendants, time periods, and courts. The court also rejected his argument concerning the second prior dismissal. It held that the lack of consent to a magistrate judge did not invalidate the dismissal because a district judge had adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation. The court further stated that a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike when the plaintiff receives leave to amend but fails to file the required amended complaint. El-Shaddai did not challenge the third prior dismissal.

The court also found that El-Shaddai had not sufficiently shown imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed the complaint. It stated that his allegations about current medical conditions were not connected to the claims in this action.

Disposition

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denied the motion for reconsideration. The court reaffirmed the dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and stated that the action would remain closed. The order also terminated Docket Nos. 50 and 51. The opinion does not state that this order itself changed the earlier dismissal’s “without prejudice” designation.