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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 7, 2021

Stanford v. General Insurance Company of America

Judge
Vince Chhabria
Docket
3:20-cv-06382
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
3
Motion to DismissInsuranceTortContract
In one sentence

In Stanford v. General Insurance, Judge Chhabria granted in part and denied in part the insurer’s motion to dismiss, allowing some claims to continue.

Who this affects

Athena Stanford and General Insurance Company of America. Stanford’s negligence and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were dismissed with prejudice; her misrepresentation claims remained; and she was allowed to amend her intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

What happened

In Stanford v. General Insurance Company of America, Athena Stanford alleged that General Insurance mishandled her insurance claim, including statements about housing coverage and a $10,000 limit for mold claims. She brought claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court dismissed the negligence and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims with prejudice. It denied the request to dismiss the negligent- and intentional-misrepresentation claims, so those claims remain. The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim without prejudice and allowed Stanford to amend that claim.

Judge Vince Chhabria ordered that any amended complaint be filed within 21 days, and that General Insurance respond within 21 days after it is filed. The court therefore granted in part and denied in part General Insurance’s motion to dismiss.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Stanford v. General Insurance Company of America · No. 3:20-cv-06382
Judge
Vince Chhabria
Date
Jan. 7, 2021

Background

Athena Stanford sued General Insurance Company of America over the handling of an insurance claim. The complaint included claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Stanford alleged that General Insurance told her that her policy would not cover housing, even though the company knew that statement was false or lacked reasonable grounds to believe it was true. She alleged that she relied on the statement by remaining in her mold-infested home, harming her and her family’s well-being. She also alleged that General Insurance falsely told her that her claim was a mold claim subject to a $10,000 limit, and that relying on this statement caused emotional and financial harm.

Rulings on the Claims

The court granted in part and denied in part General Insurance’s motion to dismiss.

The court dismissed Stanford’s negligence and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims with prejudice. It concluded that the negligence claim was barred by California’s economic-loss rule, which generally prevents recovery of tort damages for losses arising from a contract, and that negligence is generally not a viable theory against an insurance company for mishandling an insurance claim. The court explained that negligent infliction of emotional distress is part of negligence law rather than a separate tort, so that claim failed for the same reasons. The court denied leave to amend both claims because they failed as a matter of law.

The court denied General Insurance’s motion to dismiss Stanford’s negligent-misrepresentation and intentional-misrepresentation claims. It ruled that the economic-loss rule does not categorically bar these misrepresentation claims because they are based on alleged deceit or fraud and duties separate from an ordinary contract breach. Although the court noted that the complaint could have stated the facts more clearly, it found that the allegations adequately pleaded both claims. The court also declined to dismiss them as duplicative of Stanford’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing at the pleading stage.

The court dismissed Stanford’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim without prejudice. It found that the complaint did not adequately allege conduct that was extreme and outrageous enough to meet the legal standard. Because the claim was not barred as a matter of law and Stanford had not previously sought permission to amend, the court granted leave to amend that claim.

Next Steps and Disposition

Any amended complaint had to be filed within 21 days of the order. General Insurance had 21 days to respond to any amended complaint. Judge Vince Chhabria’s order therefore left the two misrepresentation claims in the case, ended the negligence-based claims with prejudice, and allowed Stanford one opportunity to amend the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

The authoritative version

Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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