Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos

Background

Satish Ramachandran sued the City of Los Altos and city employees Kirk Ballard, David Kornfield, and Christopher Jordan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. His claims concerned the city’s treatment of his property-improvement and permitting efforts, its code-enforcement actions, an inspection warrant, notices posted on his property, and a misdemeanor prosecution after he removed one of those notices.

Ramachandran claimed that he engaged in protected activity by complaining to city officials and by filing and pursuing this lawsuit. He alleged that Ballard, Kornfield, and Jordan retaliated against him because of that activity. He also claimed that the individual defendants and the city treated him differently from white homeowners because of his race or national origin, including through a longstanding practice of enforcing the Los Altos Municipal Code more strictly against non-white homeowners. The defendants disputed his characterizations and moved for summary judgment on all four claims.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view disputed evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, but that party must identify specific admissible evidence supporting a trial-worthy dispute.

First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual defendants

The court held that the First Amendment claim against Kornfield was barred by the two-year statute of limitations to the extent it relied on conduct before February 25, 2016. The parties agreed that the claim had to be limited in that way. Because Kornfield left city employment in 2018 and did not participate in the events involving the inspection warrant or later events, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment claim against him.

The court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claims against Ballard and Jordan. Defendants did not dispute for purposes of the motion that Ramachandran engaged in protected activity or that the challenged actions occurred. Instead, they argued that he could not show that his lawsuit motivated their conduct and that they would have taken the same actions anyway.

The court found factual disputes concerning retaliatory motive. It cited the timing of the inspection warrant and later enforcement actions, evidence that Ballard’s warrant declaration contained inaccurate statements and omissions, and disputes about whether the claimed code violations actually existed. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could consider this evidence in deciding whether Ballard and Jordan retaliated against Ramachandran and whether they would have taken the same actions without his lawsuit.

The court also ruled that Ballard and Jordan were not entitled to qualified immunity on this First Amendment claim. Qualified immunity can protect a government official from personal liability for damages unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court found a factual dispute about whether a constitutional violation occurred and noted that defendants did not dispute that filing and pursuing a lawsuit implicated a clearly established right against intentional retaliation.

Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim against the individual defendants

Ramachandran alleged that the individual defendants violated equal protection by enforcing city requirements against him as part of a practice of discriminating against non-white homeowners. For purposes of the motion, the court assumed, without deciding, that the continuing-violations doctrine prevented the statute of limitations from barring older conduct.

The court nevertheless granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits of this claim. It found that the evidence did not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the individual defendants enforced the city code against homeowners because of race, ethnicity, or national origin. The court rejected reliance on portions of Exhibit 24 because some contents were hearsay, Ramachandran lacked a sufficient basis for identifying homeowners’ race or ethnicity, and the materials did not reliably compare similarly situated homeowners. The court also found that evidence concerning the Jacobses showed, at most, that one white homeowner received a permit for a particular structure on one occasion. Finally, the 2013 remark by a city employee telling Ramachandran to “go back to India,” along with Ballard’s response to Ramachandran’s complaint, was insufficient by itself to establish a citywide custom or practice of discriminatory code enforcement.

Because it granted summary judgment on the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court did not reach the individual defendants’ qualified-immunity argument concerning that claim.

Municipal-liability claims against the City of Los Altos

Ramachandran brought two claims against Los Altos under the municipal-liability doctrine recognized in Monell v. Department of Social Services. One theory alleged a longstanding custom or practice of racial discrimination. The other alleged that Ballard, Kornfield, or Jordan acted as final decision makers or final policymakers for the city.

The court granted summary judgment on the third claim, which was based on a longstanding custom or practice of racial discrimination. It found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Los Altos or its Community Development Department maintained such a practice. The court also granted summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment portion of the fourth claim, because Ramachandran had not shown an underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation.

The court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment portion of the fourth claim. It found a genuine dispute about whether Ballard and Jordan violated Ramachandran’s First Amendment rights and about whether they acted as final policymakers for Los Altos. The fourth Monell claim therefore remained pending only in connection with the First Amendment retaliation theory.

Other rulings and disposition

The court declined to disregard any part of Ramachandran’s opposition brief because it substantially complied with the applicable page limits. It sustained some evidentiary objections to his declaration and Exhibit 24, including objections to the substance of homeowner communications and portions of his statements about other homeowners, while overruling or sustaining other objections as specified in the order. The court granted defendants’ request for judicial notice of the identified public records and court materials; it stated that separate judicial notice of a transcript already filed in the case was unnecessary.

The court denied Ramachandran’s request for an order requiring defendants’ counsel to explain why sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 should not be imposed. It noted both that sanctions motions should be separately filed and that defendants had achieved partial success on their summary-judgment motion.

Final ruling

Judge Virginia K. Demarchi granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The order denied the motion as to the First Amendment claims against Ballard and Jordan, held that the First Amendment claim against Kornfield was barred by the statute of limitations, and found Ballard and Jordan not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It granted the motion on the Fourteenth Amendment claims, granted the city’s motion on the third Monell claim and the Fourteenth Amendment portion of the fourth Monell claim, denied the city’s motion on the First Amendment portion of the fourth Monell claim, and denied Ramachandran’s sanctions request.