Saro v. Covello

Background

Alejandro Tiznado Saro, a state prisoner, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which permits a federal court to review whether a state prisoner is held in violation of federal law. He claimed that his defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance when advising him to accept a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of 25 years to life. Saro also moved for an evidentiary hearing to resolve alleged factual disputes about his representation.

The original charges included ten counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 by force, violence, or duress, involving five Jane Doe victims, and one count of possessing child pornography. On August 15, 2017, Saro pleaded guilty to five counts of the lesser offense of committing a lewd act on a child under 14. The parties apparently agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of 25 years to life, which the state court imposed on September 22, 2017.

At the time of Saro’s plea, California legislation was pending that would expand eligibility for youth-offender parole hearings to people who committed qualifying offenses at age 25 or younger. The legislation had passed the Assembly but had not yet passed the Senate or been signed by the Governor. It later became law, effective January 1, 2018.

Claim and governing standards

Saro argued that counsel should have told him about the pending legislation. He contended that, had he known he could receive a parole hearing after 25 years even if convicted at trial, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial. The state court summarily denied the ineffective-assistance claim, reasoning that counsel could not be expected to anticipate whether pending legislation would become law.

The federal court applied the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington: Saro had to show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the alleged error caused prejudice. Under the federal habeas statute, the court also had to defer to the state court unless its decision unreasonably applied clearly established United States Supreme Court law or rested on an unreasonable factual determination.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Saro failed to show deficient performance. When counsel advised Saro and he entered his plea, the applicable law did not provide youth-offender parole-hearing eligibility for the charged offenses because they allegedly occurred when Saro was 23 and 24, while the then-existing statute covered offenses committed before the person reached age 23. The proposed amendment was still pending and its enactment was uncertain. The court stated that counsel was not required to anticipate future legislative changes and that Saro identified no clearly established authority requiring advice about a possible change in the law.

The court also held that Saro failed to show prejudice. In the guilty-plea context, prejudice requires a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea and gone to trial absent counsel’s error. The court found that Saro’s statements showed he would have rejected the plea if he had known the amendment would become law, but did not show he would have rejected it while knowing that the proposed amendment might never become law. The court further reasoned that the plea reduced the more serious charges, and that any prejudice from not going to trial was speculative. A trial could have resulted in conviction on the more serious charges, a greater sentence, and a greater risk that parole would later be denied.

Disposition

The court found that Saro had not shown that the state court unreasonably applied federal law or unreasonably determined the facts. It therefore denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing. The court stated that no certificate of appealability would issue, directed the Clerk to enter judgment for Covello, and closed the file.