Cisneros v. Vangilder

Background

The order addressed attorneys’ fee motions in two related matters: Cisneros v. Vangilder, No. 16-cv-00735-HSG, and Manriquez v. Vangilder, No. 16-cv-01320-HSG. The cases arose from a June 4, 2015 incident at Pelican Bay State Prison. Defendant Justin Vangilder discharged a T-16 oleoresin capsicum chemical grenade, and Daniel Cisneros and Daniel Manriquez testified that vapors entered their cells, causing pain and suffering. They also testified that correctional officers ignored requests for medical attention and opportunities to leave their cells and decontaminate.

The plaintiffs asserted California negligence claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm or a serious medical need. A jury found Vangilder negligent, Vasquez negligent and deliberately indifferent, and Cupp deliberately indifferent. It awarded each plaintiff $1,000 for claims against Vangilder, $1,500 for claims against Vasquez, and $2,500 for claims against Cupp. The court later granted Cupp’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. Final judgment therefore awarded each plaintiff $1,000 against Vangilder and $1,500 against Vasquez, for a total of $2,500 each.

Fee requests under California law

The plaintiffs sought fees under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and, alternatively, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Cisneros requested $454,137.30, and Manriquez requested $467,425. Section 1021.5 permits a discretionary fee award to a successful party when the case enforces an important right, provides a significant benefit to the public or a large group, requires private enforcement whose financial burden exceeds the litigant’s personal interest, and paying fees from the recovery would be contrary to the interests of justice.

The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act did not bar a separate California-law fee award for the plaintiffs’ distinct negligence claims. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had prevailed on independent state-law causes of action and that the record supported broader implications for prisoners exposed indirectly to chemical agents and denied adequate care.

The court found the requirements of section 1021.5 satisfied. The verdicts provided a significant benefit to a large group because the evidence showed that chemical-agent use was common in California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation facilities, and the jury found that the officers’ response was inadequate. Private enforcement was necessary because the plaintiffs sued the employees responsible for the incident, who maintained that they had acted according to policy. The litigation burden also greatly exceeded each plaintiff’s modest $2,500 personal recovery. Finally, the court concluded that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to require the plaintiffs to pay fees from those recoveries.

Amount of the California-law awards

The court used the lodestar method, which generally calculates fees by multiplying reasonable hours by reasonable hourly rates. It found the requested time and rates reasonable. Counsel for Cisneros documented 1,209.50 hours and a lodestar of $454,137.30. Counsel for Manriquez documented 1,115 hours and a lodestar of $467,425.

The court nevertheless exercised its discretion to reduce or deny the requested amounts because the requested fees were approximately 180 times the plaintiffs’ damages awards. For Cisneros, the court declined to award fees. It considered that Reed Smith represented him pro bono, that the firm was large, and that counsel undertook the representation for the public good rather than as an ordinary paid engagement. The court emphasized that pro bono representation alone does not prevent a fee award, but found no award appropriate under the circumstances.

For Manriquez, the court awarded $259,237.50. His counsel represented him under a contingency agreement allowing the firm to take only fees awarded by the court, so a fee award would allow Manriquez to receive his full $2,500 verdict. The court applied an hourly rate of $232.50, which represented 150 percent of the stated $155 rate for appointed counsel, to 1,115 hours. The court found that amount more proportionate to the recovery while recognizing counsel’s work and the risk of the contingency representation.

Alternative federal fee statute

Section 1988 permits a court to award reasonable fees to a prevailing party in a civil-rights action, including an action under § 1983. Because the plaintiffs prevailed on their Eighth Amendment claims against Vasquez, the court found that their counsel were eligible for fees under section 1988. The Prison Litigation Reform Act limited those fees to $2,250 for each plaintiff, or 150 percent of the $1,500 awarded on the Eighth Amendment claims. The statute also required up to 25 percent of the judgment to be used toward the fee award.

The court found any section 1988 fees for Manriquez duplicative of the fees awarded under section 1021.5. For Cisneros, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award section 1988 fees because it did not find it fair to require him to pay part of the fees from his modest recovery.

Disposition

The court denied Plaintiff Cisneros’s motion for attorneys’ fees and granted in part Plaintiff Manriquez’s motion. It ordered defendants to pay $259,237.50 in attorneys’ fees to Manriquez as a prevailing party under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, within 30 days of the order.