Juricich v. County of San Mateo
- William Orrick
- 3:19-cv-06413
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 26
Juricich v. County of San Mateo: Judge Orrick granted most of defendants’ summary-judgment motion, left the post-arrest ADA claim, and denied Juricich’s motion.
Michael Juricich, the County of San Mateo, the County of San Mateo Sheriff’s Office, and deputies David Brandt, Lisandro Lopez, and Michael H. Koehler; the post-arrest ADA claim remained unresolved.
What happened
In Juricich v. County of San Mateo, Michael Juricich sued the County, the Sheriff’s Office, and three deputies over a December 1, 2018 police encounter. He alleged unlawful detention and arrest, excessive force, related state-law violations, and failure to accommodate his colostomy bag under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The court ruled that the deputies had reasonable grounds to briefly stop Juricich to investigate possible domestic violence and probable cause to arrest him for obstructing or delaying officers. It also found that the force used to arrest him was reasonable. Because the colostomy bag was not visible or known to the deputies before or during the arrest, the court rejected the related disability claim for that period. A factual dispute remained about whether officials were told after the arrest that Juricich needed help with the bag.
Judge Orrick granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the civil-rights claim and related state-law claims, and on the ADA claim concerning conduct before and during the arrest. He denied defendants’ motion on the post-arrest ADA claim and denied Juricich’s motion for partial summary judgment.
The detailed version
- Juricich v. County of San Mateo · No. 3:19-cv-06413
- William Orrick
- Jan. 29, 2021
Background
Michael Juricich brought claims against the County of San Mateo, the County of San Mateo Sheriff’s Office, and deputies David Brandt, Lisandro Lopez, and Michael H. Koehler. The claims arose from a December 1, 2018 encounter in San Carlos, California.
Juricich alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the deputies unlawfully detained and arrested him, used excessive force, and deprived him of needed medical care. He also brought claims under California Civil Code section 52.1, negligence, assault, battery, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). His ADA claim concerned the alleged failure to accommodate his colostomy bag. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and Juricich moved for partial summary judgment on whether the deputies’ conduct was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The encounter began after Michelle Gore, Juricich’s domestic partner, made an illegal U-turn. Deputy Brandt stopped Gore’s vehicle. Before Brandt’s patrol car fully stopped, Juricich crossed in front of it and approached the driver’s side. Brandt told Juricich to return to the sidewalk and called for assistance regarding a possible domestic incident. Deputies Lopez and Koehler later encountered Juricich walking along the shoulder of a state highway. After patrol vehicles used lights and sirens and Koehler gestured for him to stop, Juricich continued walking. Koehler grabbed him, took him to the ground, used a control hold, and handcuffed him. Juricich was arrested for violating California Penal Code section 148(a)(1).
Juricich had a colostomy bag that was under his clothing and not visible before or during the arrest. Lopez learned about it during a pat-down after the arrest. The parties disputed whether Juricich then told the deputies or jail personnel that he needed to adjust or reattach the bag. Juricich said the bag had been damaged during the arrest and that he had to remain standing for about eight hours. Defendants said he did not complain about the bag.
Section 1983 Claim
The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Juricich’s § 1983 claim. The court held that Brandt had reasonable suspicion—a specific, objective basis for briefly investigating possible criminal activity—to conduct an investigative stop. In considering the entire situation, the court relied on Juricich’s crossing in front of a moving patrol car near traffic, repeatedly saying “cite her,” not promptly returning to the sidewalk, saying that Gore was “cheating on” him, and reacting angrily when Brandt touched him to move him back.
The court also held that Brandt had probable cause to arrest Juricich for violating section 148(a)(1), which covers willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer who is performing official duties when the person knows, or reasonably should know, that the other person is an officer. The court found that Juricich obstructed and delayed Brandt’s traffic stop and later refused to stop despite the officers’ signals and commands. Lopez and Koehler were entitled to rely on the information Brandt communicated as members of the same police team.
The court rejected Juricich’s argument that the deputies could not handcuff or use force because the encounter began as an investigative stop. It held that the deputies had probable cause to arrest him after he refused to stop and continued walking despite the officers’ efforts to detain him.
On excessive force, the court applied the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness test, which balances the force used against the government’s need for it. The court characterized the arm-bar control holds and related force as a low level of force. It found that the deputies were responding to Juricich’s refusal to stop near a busy highway and that the force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the excessive-force portion of the § 1983 claim.
The court further held that the deputies would be entitled to qualified immunity even if their conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment. Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages when the law did not clearly establish that their specific conduct was unlawful. The court concluded that the precedent Juricich cited involved materially different conduct and did not clearly establish that the deputies’ actions were unconstitutional in this situation.
State-Law Claims
The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Juricich’s California Civil Code section 52.1 claim, also known as the Bane Act claim. Because the court found no Fourth Amendment violation, it held that the required interference with a constitutional or other protected right was absent.
The court also granted summary judgment on the negligence claim. It found that the deputies acted reasonably under the circumstances and that there was no evidence they negligently provoked Juricich into resisting a lawful command. The related claim against the County and Sheriff’s Office based on vicarious liability therefore also failed.
The court granted summary judgment on the assault and battery claims against Koehler and Lopez. Under the applicable California standard, those claims depended on whether the deputies used unreasonable force. Because the court found the force objectively reasonable, those claims failed as well.
ADA Claim
The court distinguished between an ADA wrongful-arrest claim and an ADA reasonable-accommodation claim. Juricich’s claim was based on an alleged failure to accommodate his colostomy bag, not on an allegation that the deputies mistook a disability’s effects for criminal conduct.
For conduct before and during the arrest, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. A public entity must know about a person’s disability and need for an accommodation before it can be required to provide one. The court found that Juricich’s colostomy bag was not visible or obvious and that the deputies were not informed of it before the arrest. The court therefore held that the County and Sheriff’s Office could not be liable for failing to accommodate the condition before or during the arrest.
For conduct after the arrest, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parties disputed whether Juricich told the deputies that he needed to reattach or adjust the bag and whether the failure to accommodate caused him greater injury or indignity than other arrestees. Those factual disputes prevented judgment at the summary-judgment stage.
Disposition
The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim and on Juricich’s second through fifth causes of action under state law. It denied Juricich’s motion for partial summary judgment. It granted defendants’ motion on the ADA claim as to conduct before and during the arrest, but denied it as to post-arrest conduct because material facts remained disputed.
Read the full 26-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.