Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:19-cv-03423
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 13
In Ward v. United Airlines, Judge Beeler certified California pilot and flight-attendant classes challenging United’s reserve-pay practices.
The order affects California-based United pilots and flight attendants who fit the certified class definitions, as well as the plaintiffs and United Airlines, Inc.
What happened
In Charles E. Ward, et al. v. United Airlines, Inc., a retired pilot and two flight attendants claimed that United’s method of paying employees on reserve status violated California wage laws. They alleged that United used flight-related pay to cover reserve-time pay when the flight-related amount exceeded the minimum guarantee.
The court found that the proposed pilot and flight-attendant classes shared the central question whether United’s common pay system violated California’s no-borrowing rule. It also found that the classes met the requirements concerning size, shared issues, representative claims, adequate representation, predominance of common issues, and the superiority of a class action.
Judge Beeler certified both California-based classes under federal class-action rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The ruling allowed the claims to proceed on a class basis but did not decide whether United actually violated California law.
The detailed version
- Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. · No. 3:19-cv-03423
- Laurel Beeler
- Feb. 12, 2021
Background
The plaintiffs—a retired pilot and two flight attendants—sued their employer, United Airlines, Inc., over how United paid pilots and flight attendants assigned to reserve status. Reserve employees were on call for flight assignments rather than working an assigned schedule. Under negotiated collective bargaining agreements, United paid reserve crew the higher of the employee’s line-pay value or a minimum-pay guarantee for the bid period.
The plaintiffs alleged that when United paid the higher line-pay value, it either failed to pay separately for reserve time or borrowed time from the line-pay calculation to compensate for reserve time. They asserted claims involving unjust enrichment, minimum wages, contractual wages, restitution under California’s Unfair Competition Law, waiting-time penalties, and penalties under California’s Private Attorneys General Act. The plaintiffs moved to certify two classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3).
Proposed Classes
The court certified these two classes:
- Pilot Class: Pilots employed by United at any time from April 2015 through final judgment who, during that period, were classified as reserve pilots during a bid period, were California residents domiciled or home-based at a California airport, and were paid under a scenario other than the minimum-pay guarantee. - Flight Attendants Class: Flight attendants employed by United at any time from April 2015 through final judgment who, during that period, were classified as reserve flight attendants during a bid period, were California residents domiciled or home-based at a California airport, and were paid under a scenario other than the minimum-pay guarantee.
Rule 23(a) Requirements
Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. The court found that the classes satisfied each requirement.
For numerosity, the plaintiffs submitted evidence that each class contained at least hundreds of members, and United did not dispute that requirement.
For commonality, the court identified a shared question: whether United’s practice of paying line-pay value instead of the minimum-pay guarantee violated California law under the no-borrowing rule discussed in Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. Although the line-pay formulas included individualized factors, the court found that United used the same basic method for both groups and that the relevant amounts appeared on uniformly formatted pay statements.
The court rejected United’s argument that individualized questions about whether employees were subject to California law defeated commonality. It noted that the wage-statement decision cited by United concerned a different California Labor Code claim. The court also stated that the class members apparently were based at California airports and generally did not perform most of their work in any one state.
For typicality, the court found that the named plaintiffs’ claims arose from the same alleged practice and involved the same legal theory as the class members’ claims.
For adequacy, the court found no conflict between the named plaintiffs and the classes and found class counsel adequate. United argued that Charles Ward was not an adequate representative for injunctive and declaratory relief because he was retired. The plaintiffs responded that Felicia Vidrio, a current employee, represented that portion of the case. The court found that sufficient because at least one named plaintiff could satisfy the standing requirement and Vidrio’s claims were identical in substance to the other class claims.
Rule 23(b) Requirements
For predominance under Rule 23(b)(3), the court found that the common question whether United’s reserve-pay practice violated the no-borrowing rule predominated over individualized issues. The court determined that the relevant payment information could be identified from pay statements.
For superiority, the court found that a class action was a more efficient way to resolve the common dispute than individual grievances under the collective bargaining agreements or individual claims through the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement. The court also rejected United’s argument that individual calculations made the classes administratively unmanageable.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), the court found that the plaintiffs sought uniform injunctive or declaratory relief addressing United’s alleged practice of paying line-pay value instead of the minimum-pay guarantee. Because the challenged practice allegedly applied generally to the classes, the court found the requirement satisfied.
Disposition
The court certified the two proposed classes—California-based pilots and California-based flight attendants—under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). The order decided only whether the case could proceed as a class action; it did not decide the underlying wage claims or determine whether United violated California law.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.