Richard Dent v. National Football League
- William Alsup
- 3:14-cv-02324
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 12
In Richard Dent v. National Football League, Judge Alsup denied the NFL’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice, because the collective-bargaining preemption issue required further factual development.
The nine named retired players and the National Football League; the order allowed the plaintiffs’ remaining negligence claim to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.
What happened
Richard Dent, Jeremy Newberry, Roy Green, J.D. Hill, Keith Van Horne, Ron Stone, Ron Pritchard, James McMahon, and Marcellus Wiley sued the National Football League over the alleged improper administration and distribution of pain medications to players. Their remaining claim alleged that the NFL negligently carried out responsibilities it had voluntarily undertaken to oversee medication practices.
The NFL argued that the claim was barred by a federal labor law because deciding it would require interpreting collective-bargaining agreements. The court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice. It explained that the agreements did not expressly cover the proper administration and distribution of medications, and that the parties’ evidence and theories might show that no agreement interpretation was needed. The NFL may raise its preemption arguments again at summary judgment or trial.
Judge William Alsup issued the February 19, 2021 order, and directed that a case-management order would follow.
The detailed version
- Richard Dent v. National Football League · No. 3:14-cv-02324
- William Alsup
- Feb. 19, 2021
Background
Nine retired individuals who had played for various professional football teams sued the National Football League in a proposed class action. They alleged that injured players were given strong pain medications—including Toradol, opioids, and local anesthetics—in ways that masked pain and allowed players to return to the field before their injuries properly healed. They alleged that the medications were provided without proper prescription, documentation, or disclosure of medical risks and side effects.
The operative third amended complaint contained one negligence claim. The plaintiffs’ surviving theory was that the NFL voluntarily undertook responsibilities involving the oversight, recordkeeping, administration, and distribution of medications but failed to carry them out with reasonable care. The opinion recounts allegations that the NFL created drug-oversight programs, required reporting and audits, established medication procedures, funded studies, and knew about continuing problems involving medication practices.
Prior Proceedings
In an earlier round of the case, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as preempted under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 301 preemption can apply when a state-law claim is based on rights created by a collective-bargaining agreement or substantially depends on interpreting one. The Court of Appeals later held that the plaintiffs’ negligence-per-se theory was not preempted, because that theory alleged that the NFL itself violated federal and state laws governing controlled substances. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of whether the plaintiffs had pleaded facts sufficient to support the claim.
The district court then dismissed the third amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the special-relationship and negligence-per-se theories but reversed as to the voluntary-undertaking theory. It held that the plaintiffs had plausibly pleaded that the NFL voluntarily undertook safety-related responsibilities and that its alleged carelessness increased the risk of harm. The Court of Appeals left the collective-bargaining preemption issue for the district court to consider.
Motion and Analysis
The NFL moved to dismiss the remaining negligence claim, arguing that the voluntary-undertaking theory was effectively the same as the previously rejected theory that the NFL negligently failed to stop the clubs’ conduct. The NFL contended that deciding whether it acted negligently would require interpreting health-and-safety provisions in the collective-bargaining agreements.
The court first addressed a possible disclaimer concerning medical care in the 2011 collective-bargaining agreement. The court found that disclaimer irrelevant at this stage because the current plaintiffs did not play in the NFL beyond 2008, and both sides agreed that the 2011 agreement did not apply to them. The court noted that the agreement might become relevant if a class were later certified.
After reviewing the applicable agreements, the court denied the NFL’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court observed that the alleged injuries involved both premature return to play and the long-term side effects of over-administered prescription medications. Unlike return-to-play issues, the proper administration and distribution of medications were not subjects that the collective-bargaining agreements expressly covered.
The court also identified factual and legal questions that could affect preemption. The plaintiffs might try to prove that the NFL’s voluntary programs could be evaluated without relying on the collective-bargaining agreements, but each alleged undertaking would need to be compared with those agreements to determine whether the issues were intertwined. The court also distinguished between a theory that the NFL negligently conducted its audits and a theory that the NFL’s audits revealed misuse by clubs and the NFL then negligently failed to intervene. The latter theory could require examining what the NFL had agreed to do under the collective-bargaining agreements and whether any agreement terms required interpretation.
The court noted that the NFL had not identified a specific collective-bargaining provision that was ambiguous and needed interpretation. It concluded that the record would be more complete if the preemption issue were addressed later rather than through another dismissal at the pleading stage.
Disposition
The court denied the NFL’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The NFL may raise its preemption arguments again on summary judgment or at trial. The court stated that a case-management order would follow.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.