Davis v. Pinterest, Inc.

Background

Harold Davis, a digital artist and professional photographer, sued Pinterest, Inc. His second amended complaint asserted direct and contributory copyright-infringement claims. Davis alleged that Pinterest lets users create image boards by “pinning” images, including images copied from elsewhere online. He further alleged that Pinterest does not screen pinned images for copyright notices, displays and distributes the images with targeted advertising, removes copyright-related information from some images, and provides copying tools.

The motion at issue concerned Count II, Davis’s contributory copyright-infringement claim. In an earlier round of the case, the court had granted Pinterest’s motion to dismiss the contributory-infringement claim. Davis later filed the second amended complaint, and Pinterest again moved to dismiss that claim.

Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a claim that does not adequately state a legal claim for relief. At this stage, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in the plaintiff’s favor, but it does not accept conclusory statements or unreasonable factual inferences.

To plead contributory copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege that someone directly infringed a copyright and that the defendant knew about that infringement and either materially contributed to it or encouraged it. For online services, the court explained that the required knowledge ordinarily must concern specific infringing material or specific acts of infringement. General knowledge that infringement might occur is not enough. The court also explained that willful blindness—deliberately avoiding learning facts—must concern specific infringement, not copyright infringement generally.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Davis had not alleged that Pinterest knew about specific third-party infringement. Davis appeared to acknowledge that he had not alleged actual knowledge, but argued that constructive knowledge—knowledge the defendant should have had—and willful blindness could be sufficient.

The court reviewed Ninth Circuit decisions discussing the knowledge requirement. It said that even if constructive knowledge could be sufficient in some circumstances, Davis still had not alleged that Pinterest had actual or constructive knowledge of specific infringement. Davis identified examples of his photographs being available on Pinterest, but did not allege that Pinterest knew or had reason to know about those particular examples. His communications with Pinterest’s chief executive officer and intellectual-property operations manager concerned misuse of his photographs generally and did not identify specific infringing acts. The opinion states that at least one email exchange showed Pinterest sought specific image files or reference information, but Davis responded that providing that information was impracticable.

The court also rejected Davis’s willful-blindness theory. Davis alleged that Pinterest removed metadata, including copyright-management information, and renamed images. But the court found that he provided no factual support for the conclusion that Pinterest did this to conceal infringement, and he did not allege that Pinterest deliberately avoided learning about infringement of his copyrights specifically. At most, the court said, the allegations suggested that Pinterest was indifferent to the general risk of copyright infringement and to the difficulty copyright owners faced in identifying misuse. That was insufficient.

Because the required knowledge element was missing under both Davis’s material-contribution and inducement theories, the court did not decide the parties’ separate arguments about whether Pinterest materially contributed to or induced infringement.

Disposition

Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. granted Pinterest’s motion to dismiss Count II without leave to amend. The court concluded that Davis had already had ample opportunity to plead a contributory-infringement claim and that further amendment would be futile. The prior scheduling order remained in effect. The opinion’s ruling addressed Count II and does not state the disposition of any other claim.