Saddozai v. Atchley

Background

Shikeb Saddozai, a state inmate proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison staff and officials at Salinas Valley State Prison and the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. He alleged that, from June through September 2020, he was repeatedly denied access to law-library services and resources needed to meet court deadlines, pursue appeals, and file grievances.

Saddozai specifically alleged that D. Farmer and S. Tomlinson supervised the law library and denied his requests for access. He also alleged that Warden M. N. Atchley and Director Connie Gipson were notified through requests and grievances, but did not correct the problem. He further alleged that his library time was cut short and that Tomlinson took copies of his legal pleadings on or about July 21, 2020. The complaint also referred to retaliation, due-process violations, other constitutional amendments, and state-law claims.

Initial screening and claims

Because Saddozai sought relief against government employees, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That screening requires the court to identify claims that can proceed and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, inadequately pleaded, or seek money from an immune defendant. The court was required to read his self-represented complaint liberally.

Access to the courts. The court explained that a prisoner asserting denial of access to the courts must show both an inadequacy in the prison’s legal-access program and an actual injury. The actual injury must involve being hindered from pursuing a non-frivolous claim concerning the prisoner’s conviction or conditions of confinement.

The court held that Saddozai had not alleged actual injury with enough detail. Although he generally said that the law-library problems caused him to default on deadlines, appeals, and grievances, he did not identify the particular case or grievance, the non-frivolous claim involved, or the specific injury. The court allowed him one opportunity to amend this claim and directed him to connect any actual injury to the conduct of a specific defendant.

The court also found that the allegations against Warden Atchley were insufficient because Saddozai did not allege Atchley’s personal involvement or a specific wrongful act with a sufficient causal connection to the alleged violation. The court dismissed the claim against Atchley with leave to amend.

As to Director Gipson, the court explained that Saddozai had not adequately alleged a supervisory relationship, an underlying constitutional violation, or an actionable conspiracy. The court stated that conspiracy by itself is not a constitutional tort under § 1983. It also found that Saddozai’s reference to a “policy or custom” was too vague, but said he could attempt to plead a claim based on an unconstitutional policy or custom if he could do so in good faith.

Retaliation. The court found the retaliation allegations insufficient. Saddozai had not alleged facts connecting the adverse action to protected conduct, or facts showing that the conduct chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights and did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The court gave him one opportunity to amend this claim against each defendant he believed was responsible.

Due process and other claims. The court found insufficient allegations that Saddozai was denied a required process when he was denied law-library access. It also held that prison officials’ failure to respond to grievances, without more, did not violate due process. The court allowed Saddozai to identify any other specific constitutional or state-law claims in an amended complaint, supported by specific facts.

Temporary restraining order and other requests

Saddozai previously sought a temporary restraining order directing defendants to stop denying law-library access, threatening him with false disciplinary actions, and interfering with his court access. The court had denied that request without prejudice because he had not satisfied the requirements for such an order, including showing a likelihood of success on the merits.

The court treated Saddozai’s objection to that decision as a motion for reconsideration and denied the motion for reconsideration. The court stated that the initial screening showed that he had not yet stated a claim against any named defendant, so he had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.

The court also denied Saddozai’s request for limited appointment of counsel. It found that the difficulties he identified were challenges faced by self-represented prisoner plaintiffs generally and did not establish exceptional circumstances.

Finally, the court treated his “peremptory challenge” as a motion for recusal. It denied the motion for recusal, finding no basis to conclude that the court’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. The opinion states that Saddozai could appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit and appeared already to have done so.

Disposition

The court ordered that the complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. Saddozai had 28 days from the filing of the order to file an amended complaint. The order stated that the amended complaint would replace the original complaint, and that claims or defendants omitted from it would no longer be part of the action. It also stated that failure to file a timely amended complaint would result in dismissal of the action without prejudice and without further notice.

The conclusion directed Saddozai to state sufficient facts for a deliberate-indifference claim as described in the order. The provided opinion text does not separately explain a deliberate-indifference analysis, so the precise relationship between that direction and the claims discussed above is unclear.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman therefore dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, denied reconsideration of the temporary restraining-order denial, denied limited appointment of counsel, and denied recusal.